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VULNERABILITY, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, AND
THE FRAGMENTED STATE
Elizabeth L. MacDowell*
This Article builds on theories of the fragmented state and of human and
institutional vulnerability to create a new, structural theory of “functional fragmen-
tation” and its role in access to justice work. Expanding on previous concepts of
fragmentation in access to justice scholarship, fragmentation is understood in the
Article as a complex phenomenon existing within as well as between state institu-
tions like courts. Further, it is examined in terms of its relationship to the state’s
coercive power over poor people in legal systems. In this view, fragmentation in
state operations creates not only challenges for access, but also opportunities for
resistance, resilience, and justice. Focusing on problem-solving courts, and family
courts in particular, the Article examines the intersection of human and institu-
tional vulnerability within legal institutions and provides a framework for identify-
ing ways to create greater access to justice. The Article contributes to state theory
and the feminist theory of vulnerability, while providing a new way to understand
and address an increasingly coercive state and its punitive effects on low-income
people.
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INTRODUCTION
Informal justice proliferates as a way to solve the everyday legal
problems experienced by low-income people and to address barriers to
access to justice.1 Consolidating social and legal services in courts, inte-
grating civil and criminal procedures, and making court procedures less
formal have long been popular mechanisms for addressing the problems
faced by low-income litigants in adversary systems.2 Proponents seek to
modify traditional legal responses in order to address what are viewed as
social rather than legal problems; they also respond to what are viewed as
problems with adversarial systems, especially for unrepresented parties.3 To
that end, specialized civil forums such as family, housing, and consumer
courts use simplified and informalized procedures; family courts also aim
to address the underlying causes of legal issues through treatment models
and ongoing judicial supervision.4 This problem-solving court model also
proliferates in the criminal legal system, where specialized courts have de-
veloped in part to ameliorate the impacts of expanding criminalization and
increasingly draconian sentencing schemes.5
Despite their good intentions, problem-solving courts in both the
criminal and civil systems tend to expand the breadth and scope of state
interventions into poor people’s lives while doing nothing to transform
underlying problems in the existing legal regime.6 Moreover, while they
1. See generally 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); Richard L. Abel, Delegalization: A Critical Review of Its Ideology,
Manifestations and Social Consequences, in 6 ALTERNATIVE RECHTSFORMEN UND ALTERNATIVEN
ZUM RECHT: JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 27, 27–47 (Erhard
Blankenburg et al. eds.,1980) (detailing the pervasive and historical character of this approach).
2. See infra Part I (describing these features of family courts).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 101, 101 (2009) (describing specialty drug courts as “designed to ameliorate the impact of
drug sentencing policy on individual drug users”). Miller notes that such courts gain support
because they “appear to reintroduce a rehabilitative ideal that had all but disappeared from main-
stream American penal practice.” Id. at 109.
6. See id. at 109–10 (discussing how specialty problem-solving courts suppress considera-
tion of race and class in criminal legal policy).
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modify or replace the adversarial system with alternative practices and per-
spectives, they do not provide substitute protective functions. Problem-
solving courts also obscure the ways in which state encroachment on civil
society and advocacy resources is linked to lessening due process protec-
tions for low-income litigants in “delegalized” courts.7
In my article Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts I
argued that reformers should draw on social justice lawyering and lay ad-
vocacy traditions to create legal services programs that help low-income
litigants resist oppressive institutional practices.8 That article lays out the
essential elements of a program that is counter-hegemonic in nature: one
that seeks to expose and transform existing power relationships that are
unequal and subordinating, including those between individuals, and be-
tween individuals and institutions.9 In this Article, I lay the theoretical
foundation for this access to justice project. To accomplish this, the Article
will focus on one central feature of the state—that of fragmentation—and
trace its operation in relation to access to justice.
In legal scholarship about access to justice, fragmentation in the legal
system has been analyzed primarily with regard to access to court services
and has generally been viewed solely as an access to justice problem.10 A
classic example of the issue of fragmentation from this perspective is when
multiple courts have jurisdiction over different aspects of a legal problem
impacting the same individuals, potentially resulting in inconsistent judg-
ments or incomplete relief.11 While not discounting the problems posed
by some forms of fragmentation, this Article conceives of fragmentation in
the legal system in a new and more comprehensive way. Here, fragmenta-
tion is understood as existing not only between different courts, or be-
tween courts and other arms of the state, but as a complex structural
feature within state institutions. Internal fragmentation includes ideologies,
roles, and other organizational features. Additionally, fragmentation both
within and between institutions is examined broadly in terms of its func-
tion, particularly with regard to the coercive power of the state over poor
and low-income people.12 The role of access to justice interventions in this
view includes not only curtailing forms of fragmentation that are problem-
atic for poor people (such as those that impede access to services or reme-
dies), but also preserving, restoring, or building forms of fragmentation
7. See infra Part IV.B (discussing research on self-help programs).
8. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts,
22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473 (2015) [hereinafter MacDowell, Reimagining].
9. Id. at 525–41.
10. See infra Part III.B (discussing rationales for interventions such as integrated courts that
reduce fragmentation).
11. Id.
12. See infra Part II (establishing the theoretical framework and defining fragmentation).
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that can foster greater justice.13 I build this new conception, which I refer
to as functional fragmentation, from two sources.
First, theories of the state as consisting of coordinated fragmenta-
tion—or layered or “loosely coupled” parts14—are particularly useful for
analyzing the role of fragmentation in facilitating (or conversely, reducing
or eliminating) justice.15 Using this theory, scholars have shown how the
state increases its power over targeted groups by tightening linkages among
or between its parts. Scholars have also used the theory to show the oppor-
tunities for advocacy that exist within the loosely coupled state.16 This
Article picks up and expands on this strand of political theory to analyze
how access to justice interventions can recognize and utilize the state’s
capacity for greater and lesser degrees of fragmentation in ways that are
positive for poor people.17
Second, vulnerability theory helps us analyze how linked institutions
and organizations are susceptible to policies and practices that reduce func-
tional fragmentation.18 I will explore vulnerability along two dimensions:
institutional vulnerability, and the resulting challenges for human subjects
who are vulnerable to state interventions. Institutional vulnerability in this
analysis includes the vulnerability of legal institutions to shifts in the nature
of their couplings that are destructive to public interests, and the vulnera-
bility of both state institutions and nongovernmental organizations
(“NGOs”) to be coopted, jeopardizing their roles and missions.19 While
vulnerability theory is generally used to argue for strong state interventions
(viewed as necessary to address the inevitable condition of human vulnera-
bility), it is also useful for showing how the vulnerability of litigants be-
comes a rationale for more coercive state practices.20
Discerning the characteristics and conditions of functional fragmen-
tation is especially urgent given the increasingly punitive treatment of the
poor by the state, or what has come to be called the criminalization of
poverty.21 Tightening of the linkages between state agencies, institutions,
13. See infra Part IV (setting forth the foundational principles for achieving functional
fragmentation).
14. See generally Elizabeth Ben-Ishai, The Autonomy-Fostering State: “Coordinated Fragmenta-
tion” and Domestic Violence Services, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 307 (2008); Lynne A. Haney, Feminist State
Theory: Applications to Jurisprudence, Criminology, and the Welfare State, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 641
(2000); John Hagan, The Everyday and the not so Exceptional in the Social Organization of Criminal
Justice Practices, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1990).
15. See infra Part II.A (discussing theories of the fragmented state).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part IV (applying principles of functional fragmentation to problem-solving
courts).
18. See infra Part III (applying the theoretical framework).
19. Id.
20. See infra Part II (establishing the framework).
21. See generally Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 643 (2009) [hereinafter Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty].
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and processes—including through the blending of ostensibly supportive
processes with punitive ones—has dire consequences for marginalized
groups.22 In particular, the erosion of the divide between civil and criminal
processes has both widened and tightened nets entrapping poor people in
coercive or punitive state systems, especially poor women and men of
color.23 This erosion also exacerbates inequalities in ostensibly private,
non-state relationships, as the state increasingly expands its reach into civil
society.24 These conditions are the context in which access to justice ini-
tiatives take place. Moreover, access to justice initiatives themselves can
operate as vehicles for coercive state practices, conducted under the guise
of helping vulnerable populations.25 Thus, a theory of access to justice that
can help reformers and activists distinguish helpful from harmful interven-
tions is urgently needed.
By way of example, I will focus on the policies and practices of fam-
ily courts and linked administrative agencies that reduce fragmentation and
produce tightening. Family courts exemplify the relationship between in-
formalized justice, interventionist state policies, and the tightening of con-
stituent parts within the state that characterizes the consolidation of state
power in the modern era, which I refer to collectively as “delegaliza-
tion.”26 To analyze litigant vulnerability, I will show how family courts
help to maintain hierarchies relating to race, class, and gender.27 Vulnera-
bility theory will strengthen the analysis of how the advantages of func-
tional fragmentation are jeopardized in family courts, why that is a
concern for low-income people engaging with the courts, and how prin-
ciples of functional fragmentation can be utilized to build resilience to un-
wanted state interventions among marginalized communities.28
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the long-standing
relationship between initiatives intended to increase access to justice and
state efforts at social control within delegalized courts. Using the family
court example, I focus on two types of cases for this analysis, each with
22. See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support,
25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 2 (2014); Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminal-
ization of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297 (2013) [hereinafter Gustafson, Degra-
dation Ceremonies]; Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 21.
23. Examples include linkages that condition access to social services on criminal legal
involvement as a victim or offender, the use of criminal penalties rather than administrative ones
to punish violation of administrative rules, and the criminalization of the conditions and conse-
quences of poverty. See Bach, supra note 22; Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., NOAH KATZ ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T,
GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL: WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER THREAT (2016) (detailing link-
ages between punitive state systems and ostensibly private work relationships).
25. See infra Part IV.B (discussing self-help programs).
26. See infra Part I.A (analyzing the history and culture of family courts).
27. Id.
28. See infra Part II.B (proposing a theoretical framework for analyzing fragmentation
within family and other problem-solving courts).
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gendered as well as other particularities: domestic violence and child sup-
port. Next, I show how delegalization in problem-solving courts has influ-
enced the development of constitutional doctrine. This Part shows how
the Supreme Court’s analysis of due process uses the conditions of delegal-
ization to limit procedural due process rights for poor people.
Part II presents the theoretical framework, drawing on scholarship on
the fragmented state and vulnerability theory. This Part also incorporates
amendments to vulnerability theory proposed by critical race and other
theorists.29 The resulting framework synthesizes and expands on the
strengths of both theories to better analyze operation of the fragmented
state and its potential for fostering justice.
Part III applies this framework to problem-solving courts to show
how tightening of the loosely coupled state happens in legal systems char-
acterized by informality and intervention. This Part identifies the mecha-
nisms of reduced fragmentation, and shows how conventional notions of
vulnerability are used to justify these changes. This Part also examines how
low-income people are impacted by reduced fragmentation in specifically
raced and gendered ways that are often detrimental to their well-being.
Part IV establishes a framework for functional fragmentation—
namely, state fragmentation that is functional for poor people. This Part
lays out the foundational principles of this approach, which requires cen-
tering the experiences of low-income people of color and maintaining
partiality to social justice values in all aspects of system design and imple-
mentation. This Part then applies these foundational principles to suggest
priorities and possible directions for court reform.
The Article concludes with some preliminary remarks on the con-
cept of “justice space”: my term for the space within a functionally frag-
mented state where a reimagined vision of access to justice can take form.
I. DELEGALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL
A. The Family Court Example
Delegalization in family courts is sometimes characterized as a mod-
ern development, but has long been part of the experience of low-income
populations when dealing with so-called minor disputes in the family.30
Delegalization in family courts consists of three interrelated features: in-
formalism, including the use of informal dispute resolution and the simpli-
fication of procedures and forms in ways that deemphasize law;
interventionism, such as the use of psychologists, social workers, and other
29. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93
N.C. L. REV. 1339, 1373–78 (2015); Nina A. Kohn, Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Govern-
ment, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 21–23 (2014).
30. See Christina B. Harrington, Delegalization Reform Movements: A Historical Analysis, in
1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 1, at 52–54
(describing the origins of family courts in the Progressive era).
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experts as an extension of judicial fact-finding; and intersecting state sys-
tems, including criminal, civil, and child welfare systems, and administra-
tive arms of the state.31 Justified with the rhetoric of crisis and
participatory justice, and fueled by competing goals of social control and
access to justice, each of these features has worked to expand the reach of
the state.32
The historical roots of delegalization in family courts can be traced to
the emergence of domestic relations courts (DRCs) during the Progressive
Era, using a juvenile court model expressly intended to offer social rather
than legal justice.33 DRCs emerged as criminal courts of law with jurisdic-
tion over cases such as wife abandonment, illegitimacy, failure to support,
offenses against minors, and custody disputes.34 Like juvenile courts, do-
mestic relations courts were staffed with probation officers, social workers,
and sometimes medical and psychiatric professionals who performed inves-
tigative and supervisory roles.35 DRCs also offered conciliation, defined
broadly as efforts by any court personnel to resolve disputes between fam-
ily members, as a distinguishing feature from divorce courts.36 Conciliation
was seen as a service to keep families together but also as essential to
31. See MacDowell, Reimagining, supra note 8, at 488–91 (analyzing these features of fam-
ily courts).
32. Id. at 492–94.
33. See Paul W. Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The Family Court, 21 MO.
L. REV. 105, 106 (1956) (“The family court also strives to wed the legal and social sciences. It
lifts bodily the main features of the philosophy, methodology and procedure of the juvenile court
and adapts them to the family court”). For a discussion of the juvenile court movement philoso-
phy of “socialized” courts, see Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham, The Socialized Juvenile
Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 143–46 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingam eds.,
1978).
34. These issues were criminalized in the early nineteenth century through statutes such
as the American Uniform Desertion Act of 1910. See REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND
THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGEN-
CIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFER-
ENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (1919). See also NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMERICAN UNIFORM DESERTION ACT: BEING THE DRAFT
OF AN ACT RELATING TO DESERTION AND NON-SUPPORT OF WIFE BY HUSBAND, OR OF
CHILDREN BY EITHER FATHER OR MOTHER, AND PROVIDING PUNISHMENT THEREFOR; AND
TO PROMOTE UNIFORMITY BETWEEN THE STATES IN REFERENCE THERETO (1910), http://
hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044053412987.
35. See WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW
YORK CITY 6 (1954) (arguing that “proper disposition of many [family court] cases requires the
discovery of the root cause and an effort to eradicate it rather than merely treating the symptom
by punitive or purely legal remedies” and advocating for harmonizing jurisprudence with “soci-
ological and therapeutic knowledge”). See also Louise Stevens Bryant, Department of Diagnosis and
Treatment for a Municipal Court, 9 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 198 (1918)
(describing the issues in DRCs as “overwhelmingly dependent upon medical and psychological
interpretations”).
36. Harrington, supra note 30, at 54.
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processing the large numbers of cases handled by the courts, which justi-
fied an interventionist stance.37
As reformers subsequently sought and won decriminalization of
these family-related disputes, the practice of conciliation moved to civil
courts, including those handling divorce, as another feature of delegalized
dispute management.38 Family law courts of equity were created in order
to expand judicial discretion, and thus power.39 The belief in science as a
more rational basis than law for dealing with human problems, along with
shifts away from fault-based determinations toward an emphasis on pro-
tecting children, justified increasing and accelerated government interven-
tion into even middle class families.40 However, the impacts of
delegalization began much earlier, and have always been harsher, for low-
income families.
At the turn of the 20th century, when family courts emerged, Blacks
migrating to Northern cities from the South and an influx of southern
European immigrants worried white reformers and eugenics-based theo-
ries about inherent criminality and social deviance still held influence.41
For reformers, the new family courts increased access to justice by reduc-
ing the need for lawyers, increasing efficiency, and making courts more
accessible.42 However, the belief that fair courts were necessary to socialize
new populations of urban poor and working class and stave off political
insurrection lent urgency to calls for court reforms.43 Thus, the paradoxi-
37. Id.
38. See Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations in Divorce Cases, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 713, 718–28 (1986) (blaming the practice of custody investigations on divorce reformers who
have adopted the rhetoric of nineteenth century juvenile court “child savers”).
39. Id.
40. See generally Michael Grossberg, Who Gets the Child? Custody, Guardianship, and the
Rise of Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, 9 FEMINIST STUD. 235, 241–45 (1983)
(describing how, beginning in the 19th Century, judges used the shift from paternal control over
children to the best interest of the child standard to consolidate power and police female
behavior).
41. Cheryl Nelson Butler, Blackness as Delinquency, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1365–68
(2013) (describing the persistence of eugenics-based theories of Black inferiority in the juvenile
court system). See also Anthony Platt, The Rise of the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social
Policy and Correctional Reform, 381 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 21, 22 (1969) (describ-
ing the influence on “child savers” of “ideas about the biological and environmental origins of
crime”).
42. See SMITH, supra note 34, at 78 (describing how simplified procedures and forms in
family court help to eliminate the need for lawyers).
43. As opined by Henry S. Pritchett, then-President of the Carnegie Foundation (which
funded Smith’s report, JUSTICE AND THE POOR): “For no group in the citizenship of this coun-
try is [a fair administration of justice] more needed than in the case of the great mass of citizens
of foreign birth, ignorant of the language, and helpless to secure their rights unless met by an
administration of the machinery of justice that shall be simple, sympathetic, and patient. To such,
the apparent denial of justice forms the path to disloyalty and bitterness.” SMITH, supra note 34,
at xi–xii. See also id. at ix (then-Senator of New York Elihu Root opining in the foreword,
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cal effects of the problem-solving court emerged as poor and low-income
families were funneled into state systems that sought to both provide assis-
tance and exert control.
Following the criminalization of matters like desertion and nonsup-
port, for example, reformers claimed sums collected from absent fathers on
behalf of their needy wives and children as examples of success.44 How-
ever, criminalization of these issues also swelled the number of low-in-
come families caught in the criminal legal system, with lower-income
families of color disproportionately affected.45 Informality, including the
use of social workers to investigate families in custody cases, and the broad-
ening discretion of judges in family court cases, also facilitated the imposi-
tion of White middle-class values and stereotypes on low-income
families.46
There is no evidence that the situation has improved.47 While issues
like support became civil matters handled in family courts with civil juris-
diction, the failure to pay support remains a crime in every state. This
leaves the decision of whether to file charges and pursue support through
criminal enforcement as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.48 Civil courts
can also use jail time to enforce child support orders through the civil
contempt process.49 Furthermore, while (unlike during the Progressive
“[Smith’s report] should be of great value to the multitude of Americans who are interested in
the Americanization of the millions of foreigners who have immigrated to this country, and who
fail to understand or who misunderstand American institutions”). Smith underscores the con-
cern that the failure to prioritize Americanization will lead to political instability. See id. at 6
(warning that “[t]he inhabitants of the American colonies learned from the tyrannies and arbi-
trary conduct of George III and the Royal Governors what denial of justice meant, and it incited
them to rebellion”). See also MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 at 16 (1993) (observing that “Americanization rather than
class injustice became the central focus when the American Bar Association considered Smith’s
report”).
44. See Charles Zunser, The Domestic Relations Courts, 124 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 114, 118 (1926).
45. By 1923, 68.4 percent of people on probation in all magistrate courts in New York
City were “non-supporters.” A study of nonsupport cases in Philadelphia from 1916 to 1920
found that Black husbands were represented at rates that were double their presence in the city’s
general adult population. S. Howard Patterson, Family Desertion and Non-Support, 5 J. DELINQ.
249, 271 (1922).
46. See Butler, supra note 41, at 1358–61 (discussing operation of White middle class
norms in the juvenile justice system during this era).
47. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U.
CINN. L. REV. 891, 894–97 (2010) (describing the expanding use of informal and intervention-
ist procedures, including use of child custody investigations and mediation, in private party
cases); see also Levy, supra note 38, at 716–17).
48. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 50 STATE CRIMINAL NON-SUP-
PORT LAWS, http://ncsl.org/research/human-services/criminal-nonsupport-and-child-support
.aspx.
49. See infra Part I.B (describing the use of civil contempt in child support cases).
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era) there are now public benefits available to assist custodial parents with
needy children, the state will enforce a support order against the noncus-
todial parent to reimburse benefit payments whether the custodial parent
wants a support order or not.50
Additionally, unlike married couples, unmarried parents are com-
pelled to go to family court to legally establish paternity and child support
obligations.51 And marriage is increasingly a class and race-based phenom-
enon. Noting that education is a rough proxy for income level, Jane Mur-
phy and Jana Singer report that, “more than 60 percent of new mothers
with a high school education or less” are unmarried, compared to less than
10 percent of new mothers who are college-educated.52 Additionally,
marriage rates among low-income African Americans have declined so
sharply in recent decades that, as Murphy and Singer observe, “marriage
has effectively disappeared from some low-income communities of
color.”53 Unsurprisingly then, given the prevalence of punitive child sup-
port enforcement policies and a biased system, low-income fathers are still
more likely to owe support and be imprisoned for it, and low-income men
of color are still disproportionately jailed for not paying child support.54
White middle class values also continue to predominate in the family
court system, with detrimental results for low-income families.55 Scholars
such as Dorothy Roberts have detailed the ongoing prevalence of class and
racial bias in juvenile and child-welfare cases where the state is a party.56
50. Incarceration may also result from failure to pay such orders. See Elizabeth G. Patter-
son, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95 (2009).
51. Stacy Brustin & Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Paved with Good Intentions: Unintended Conse-
quences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. REV. 803, 804
(2015).
52. JANE MURPHY & JANA SINGER, DIVORCED FROM REALITY: RETHINKING FAMILY
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 61 (2015).
53. Id.
54. According to the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement, “70 percent of child
support arrearages are owed by noncustodial parents with no annual earnings or earnings less
than $10,000. Only 4 percent are owed by noncustodial parents with an annual income of
$40,000 or more.” Patterson, supra note 50, at 118. See also infra Part I.B (discussing the likeli-
hood of wrongful incarceration of low-income obligors). Additionally, “African Americans fa-
thers comprise nearly 80% of those incarcerated by the child support enforcement system and are
incarcerated at a rate ten times higher than other fathers.” KATZ ET AL., supra note 24, at 3.
55. Moreover, racial and class disparities persist. See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves
or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social
Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 L & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 70 (2010) (describing the stark dispar-
ity between the people served by family courts, who are disproportionately low-income people
of color, and the bench and bar, who are overwhelmingly White and middle class).
56. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 59
(2001) (describing studies showing that child protection caseworkers evaluate families based on
an ideal of a “white, middle-class family composed of married parents and their children”; see
also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare “Reform,”
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Subordinating impacts such as loss of rights and invasion of privacy are also
prevalent in cases where the state is not a party.57 For example, domestic
violence protection orders may result in state interventions that impact
poor families differently. Applying for a protection order often brings sur-
vivors in contact with individuals with child abuse reporting obligations.58
As a result, revealing details of abuse on a protection order application may
result in intervention by a child welfare agency and charges being brought
against the survivor for failure to protect her children from the abuse.59
Additionally, protection orders are enforceable by police and violation of a
protection order is a crime in every state.60 While such orders are unevenly
enforced to protect survivors, they sometimes result in undesired contact
with law enforcement when they are enforced against survivors’ wishes.61
Being subject to a protection order can also adversely impact employment
and have other collateral consequences, which is a problem for survivors
who are dependent on the adverse party’s income.62
Despite such problems, survivors who are low-income may be par-
ticularly reliant on protection orders. Studies show protection orders are
the most common way to engage with the state in response to domestic
Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 707 (1998) (explaining that caseworkers
have biases about bad mothering that are based on race and class). In cities such as Chicago, over
95 percent of children in foster care are non-White. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG
WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 205 (2005); see also ROBERTS, supra (reporting that one out of every
ten children from central Harlem in New York City is placed in foster care, compared to a total
of only 200 children from the wealthy Upper East Side).
57. See generally Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of
State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 2 n.1 (1996) (reporting findings of
gender bias task forces from more than thirty states, Puerto Rico, the Ninth Circuit, and the
District of Columbia Circuit). See also Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS
952 (1996) (providing a bibliography of task force reports). For links to racial and gender fairness
task forces and reports, see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GENDER AND RACIAL FAIR-
NESS STATE LINKS, http://ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Gender-and-Racial-Fairness/
State-Links.aspx?cat!Gender%20Fairness%20Task%20Forces%20and%20Reports.
58. See Rebecca Fialk & Tamara Mitchel, Jurisprudence: Due Process Concerns for the Under-
represented Domestic Violence Victim, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 183 (2004) (describing risks to
survivors from their exposure to mandatory child abuse reporters in domestic violence courts).
59. See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 557 (2005)
(describing that “numerous state and local agencies have adopted policies of removing children
from their mothers’ custody because the children witnessed or could have witnessed their
mothers being abused by husbands, boyfriends, or other intimates”).
60. TK Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protection Order Outcomes: Violations and Perceptions
of Effectiveness, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 675, 676 (2009).
61. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLU-
TION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 19–34 (2009). Violation of some protection order provisions
is also a deportable offence. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)
(2012).
62. See, e.g., Putman v. Kennedy, 900 A.2d 1256, 1261–63 (Conn. 2006) (identifying the
possibility of “significant collateral consequences” as a result of a protection order, including
employment and immigration consequences, and social stigma).
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violence after calling 911—perhaps in part because they are, practically
speaking, the only game in town.63 Additionally, an application for a pro-
tection order may be necessary to obtain other types of assistance like ac-
cess to battered women’s shelters, and obtaining emergency cash assistance
such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”), even when
not officially required.64 A protection order may also be demanded by
child welfare agencies (and required to defend against charges of failure to
protect) whether the applicant believes an order will increase her safety or
not.65 For undocumented survivors, a protection order may be required to
support application for immigration relief based on the abuse.66
The reliance on protection orders, whether due to a lack of viable
alternatives or because they are required by other “helping” agencies, also
exposes applicants to additional deleterious impacts of gender and racial
bias. Women bringing claims of domestic violence in family court have
been found to have worse outcomes in their child custody case, especially
63. Logan & Walker, supra note 60, at 685. See also Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System
Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case Management and Technology
Solutions, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 147, 149 (Al-
bert R. Roberts ed., 2002) (reporting that domestic violence survivors are more likely to seek
protection through civil protection orders than the criminal justice system); Sally F. Goldfarb,
Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without
Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2008) (characterizing civil protec-
tion orders as the “most commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”); PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY 52 (2000) (reporting that as many as 20 percent of the 1.5 million annual
survivors of domestic violence obtain civil protection orders).
64. See TIMOTHY CASEY ET AL., Legal Momentum, Not Enough: What TANF Offers
Family Violence Victims 11 (2010) (describing how survivor’s reports of victimization are
treated with disbelief by some welfare case workers). One study found that “Forty percent of
respondents indicated that victims granted an extension, exemption, or specialized response are
likely to face other requirements or conditions. Respondents listed the following examples of
mandated requirements for victims: work, contact a domestic violence program, make a police
report, receive counseling or mental health treatment, waive confidentiality, obtain a protective
order, cooperate with child protection, attend support group, notify TANF of any relocations,
go into a domestic violence shelter, leave the family home, or not allow the abusive partner to
have contact with the children.” Id. at 13. The study concluded that such requirements made
survivors less safe. Id.
65. See Kim, supra note 59, at 591.
66. See generally Rebecca Orloff et al., Introduction to Immigration Relief for Immigrant Victims
of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS (Kathleen Sullivan & Leslye Orloff
eds., 2013). Conversely, an undocumented survivor’s immigration status may result in a family
court judge denying the protection order based on the false belief that the order will confer status
on the survivor. Leslye Orloff et al., Ensuring Access to Protection Orders for Immigrant Victims of
Family Violence, in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS AND RE-
SOURCES FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS, id. at 1.
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if the father seeks custody.67 This is true despite statutes that disfavor
granting custody to parents who are found to have committed domestic
violence.68 These outcomes suggest the strong and ongoing influence of
gender bias against women in these cases.69 Additionally, the outcome may
depend on whether survivor conforms to raced as well as gendered stereo-
types about victims, and whether the adverse party is a “perceivable perpe-
trator.”70 The interplay of tropes about race, gender, and victimization
creates additional barriers to justice for women of color, and allows White
men to more easily benefit from gender bias against women when abuse is
alleged.71 The absence of attorneys and the use of informal processes to
gather information increase the likelihood that biases will come into the
case unopposed.
Most litigants in family court are unrepresented by counsel because
they cannot afford a lawyer, with higher rates of pro se litigants in child
support and domestic violence cases.72 Studies show that only fifty percent
67. See LUNDY BANCROFT ET AL., THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE IM-
PACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 142–43 (2012) (noting that fathers who
batter seek and obtain custody at higher rates than commonly realized).
68. At least twenty-five states have statutory presumptions that custody of minor children
should not be awarded to a parent who has committed domestic violence. See Amy Levin &
Linda G. Mills, Fighting for Child Custody When Domestic Violence Is at Issue: Survey of State Laws,
48 SOC. WORK 463, 466 (2003) (summarizing state statutes). However, researchers report that
40 percent of fathers adjudicated as having committed domestic violence against the mother
were still awarded joint custody in states with such a presumption. See Allison C. Morrill et al.,
Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother,
11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076, 1101 (2005). In states where there is both a presumption
against granting custody to abusers and another in favor of joint custody, survivors seeking cus-
tody fared even worse: sole custody was awarded to abusive fathers more often than to survivors.
Id. Survivors also received sole physical custody less frequently than in states with no statutory
presumption. Id. at 1093.
69. See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657,
686–87 (2003) (observing that gender bias cannot be ruled out in understanding judges’ reluc-
tance to withhold custody from batterers).
70. See generally Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and Inter-
sectional Theory on Domestic Violence, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 531 (2013) [hereinafter Mac-
Dowell, Theorizing from Particularity].
71. See id. at 544-45 (describing stereotypes about women of color that distance them
from tropes about the “perfect victim”); id. at 557 (describing stereotypes that associate men of
color with the perpetration of violence).
72. See JUDICIAL COUNSEL OF CAL. TASK FORCE ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS,
STATEWIDE ACTION PLAN FOR SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 2 (2004) (reporting up
to 72 percent of family law litigants in California courts are unrepresented at filing; up to 96
percent are unrepresented at disposition); OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR
JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES:
THE RESULTS OF TWO SURVEYS 1 (2005) (reporting that 75 percent of litigants appearing in
New York City Family Court were unrepresented). See also Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal
Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 123, 125 (1993) (reporting the results of a
District of Columbia study finding 93 percent of defendants in child support enforcement cases,
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of applicants for legal aid services receive the assistance they need, and less
than one in five people have their legal needs met.73 The lack of attorneys
for poor people is exacerbated by federal funding restrictions for legal aid,
which prohibit services for incarcerated people and others at the nexus of
punitive regulatory systems like immigration, family, and criminal law.74
Other service providers, like public defenders, are also unprepared to meet
the needs of clients who are facing the many civil consequences of crimi-
nal convictions.75 Thus, the erosion of distinctions between legal regimes,
including through the use of criminal punishments to enforce civil
schemes like child support, not only creates new legal needs for poor peo-
ple, it has tremendous implications for procedural due process. This is par-
ticularly true in the “poor people’s courts”—courts whose dockets are
populated in large part by low-income, unrepresented litigants on one or
both sides of the case. The next Section describes the doctrinal founda-
tions of this system.
B. Due Process in Delegalized Settings
Procedural due process protects individuals against government ac-
tion that deprives them of liberty or property interests established under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.76 Due
process is a flexible standard that requires “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’.”77 The test for procedural
due process is set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, and balances (1) the impor-
tance of the interest at stake for the person or persons seeking additional
protection; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest because
where potential sanctions include incarceration, were unrepresented); JOHN M. GREACEN, SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL SERVICES RESPONSES TO THEIR NEEDS:
WHAT WE KNOW 3–6 (2002). A majority of tenants in housing court, and consumers in small
claims courts, are also without counsel for economic reasons. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-
Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35, 41–43 (2009) (summarizing data from studies of self-representation in
housing, small claims, and family law cases).
73. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CUR-
RENT UNMET CIVIL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 12 (2009), https://www.lsc.gov/
sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf.
74. See Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A Call to End
Draconian and Wasteful Restrictions, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 693 (2009) (describing restric-
tions on practice by legal aid organizations receiving federal funds). Restrictions include provid-
ing any legal services for inmates related to litigation, even on family law matters. Id. See also
Elizabeth L. MacDowell & Ann Cammett, Models of Invisibility: Rendering Domestic and Other
Gendered Violence Visible to Students through Clinical Law Teaching, 22 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1438, 1442 (2016) (observing that even privately funded legal aid providers direct lim-
ited resources to clients unlikely to appeal to funders’ conceptions about the deserving poor).
75. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Cesney-Lind, eds., 2002).
76. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976).
77. Id. at 334.
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of the procedures currently used, and the probable value of additional pro-
cedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, “including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”78 The Supreme Court
has on occasion criticized the informalism of family court procedures.79
However, the Mathews test has been applied to limit access to counsel in
cases in the poor people’s courts, including cases involving termination of
parental rights,80 and most recently, in Turner v. Rogers, incarceration based
on civil contempt for failure to pay child support.81 Observers have noted
that the Mathews test is weighted against individuals seeking additional due
process protection.82 Indeed, the Court’s analysis in these cases reinforces
the hegemonic functions of the poor people’s courts—not only because it
limits access to counsel for indigent litigants, but because it fails to fully
acknowledge or interrogate the operation of the state in these forums. The
Court’s analysis is lacking in this regard in at least three broad, interrelated
aspects.
First, in applying the Matthews test, the Court characterizes the pub-
lic and private interests at stake in ways that obscure their true nature. For
example, in Turner, the Court is particularly concerned with the potential
unfairness of appointing counsel to an indigent noncustodial parent (who
owes child support) in a contempt proceeding where the custodial parent
(who is owed child support) is unrepresented by counsel.83 The Court
opines that appointing counsel to the noncustodial parent in such a case
would “create an asymmetry of representation” that could make the pro-
ceeding less fair for families that seek support.84 The Court further notes
that “[t]he needs of such families play an important role in our analysis.”85
The Court’s framing presumes an alignment between the state’s interest in
adjudicating cases involving nonpayment of child support and the interest
78. Id. at 334–35.
79. See, e.g., Sandusky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982) (the fair preponderance of
the evidence standard violates the due process rights of parents in termination of parental rights
cases); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (juveniles accused of crimes in delinquency proceedings
must be afforded the due process protections of adults, such as the right to timely notification of
the charges, the right to confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to
counsel); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966) (waiver of jurisdiction from a juvenile
court to a district court must be voluntary and knowing).
80. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
81. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
82. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudi-
cation: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976). Mashaw argues
that the Mathews test can be restated as the following formula: “Void procedures for lack of due
process only when alternative procedures would so substantially increase social welfare that their
rejection seems irrational.” Id. at 48.
83. Turner, 564 U.S. at 446–47.
84. Id. at 447.
85. Id.
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of the custodial parent who is not receiving support owed to her pursuant
to a child support order. This line of analysis ignores the potential conflicts
between the interest of the custodial parent in securing financial support
for her children (an interest shared by the public) and the interest of the
welfare arms of the state in avoiding financial responsibility (which the
public has also been encouraged to share).86 The former interests are not
well-served by sentencing an indigent parent to jail, where he will likely be
unable to find employment, and which will decrease his chances of finding
work once he is released.87 Arguably, the latter interests are not well
served, either. However, maintaining the onus of responsibility (and the
blame of policy failure) on noncustodial parents does serve the state’s inter-
ests (and indirectly, those of the public) by deflecting government respon-
sibility for the financial well-being of children.88 Moreover, the state
interest as embodied by the family court is to manage its docket by
processing cases quickly; the family court is not involved in policy-setting
at the macro level of child support enforcement.89 None of these govern-
mental interests corresponds with protecting the procedural due process
rights of defendants in family courts, or even collecting child support for
custodial parents. This is a problem that the Court’s analysis utterly fails to
acknowledge.90
86. See e.g., Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 22, at 344–48 (describing how
degradation ceremonies justify state policies that create material deprivation for poor Black
families).
87. Notably, this is true irrespective of the custodial parent’s desire to enforce the order
and collect support or punish the noncustodial parent for failure to pay—a narrow set of options
established by means largely outside of the custodial parent’s control. See, e.g., Turner, 564 U.S.
at 447 (observing that the custodial parent asked the court to incarcerate the noncustodial parent
due to his pattern of nonpayment).
88. See, e.g., Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 22, at 344–48 (describing how
degradation ceremonies legitimize conditions of subordination maintained by state policies).
89. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981), 452 U.S. at 28 (acknowl-
edging “[t]he State’s interests . . . clearly diverge from the parent’s insofar as the State wishes the
termination decision to be made as economically as possible and thus wants to avoid both the
expense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings his presence may
cause”). See also Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social
Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2006) [hereinafter Engler, Shaping a
Context-Based Civil Gideon] (describing the primary concern of the poor people’s court as mov-
ing the docket along).
90. The Court also ultimately minimized the extent and significance of opposing interests
in Lassiter. There, the majority asserted that individuals facing termination of parental rights
share a common interest with the child welfare agency in an accurate and just decision. Lassiter,
452 U.S. at 28. With this assertion, the majority ignored the state’s interest in avoiding error as
measured by children who are harmed after being returned to their families. Such cases subject
state officials and institutions to public ridicule and are in tension with a concurrent interest in
accuracy and fairness. Indeed, from the point of view of state institutions, the best way to avoid
mistakenly returning children to abusive homes may be to not return any children once they
have been removed.
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The complex and conflicting nature of public and private interests is
further obscured by the Court’s deference to administrative expertise.91 In
Turner, the majority relies on the federal government’s “considerable expe-
rience in helping to manage statutorily mandated federal-state efforts to
enforce child support orders” in determining the existence of adequate
procedural safeguards other than appointment of counsel.92 In accordance
with suggestions from the Solicitor General, the majority finds that alter-
natives to representation, including the use of pleading forms to elicit the
defendant’s financial information, and active judicial questioning, would
be sufficient in private civil contempt proceedings where the opposing
party is unrepresented.93 Because the defendant in Turner did not have the
benefit of counsel or these alternatives, his due process rights were vio-
lated; however, the Court holds that there is no absolute right to appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent litigants in civil contempt proceedings.94
Thus, the majority in Turner relies on the conditions of delegalization it-
self—that is, on the absence of counsel and the existence of informal pro-
cedures—to justify further curtailment of procedural due process rights in
what remains an adversarial proceeding.95 In so doing, the Court unjustifi-
91. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (stating “[i]n assessing what
process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the
individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the
procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals”).
In Mathews, the Court granted deference to SSA procedures for termination of benefits without
an evidentiary hearing, despite evidence of high rates of reversal of termination decisions after
trial. Id. at 346–47, 349. See also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447–48 (2011) (relying on
representations made in the amicus curiae brief of the United States Solicitor General in reaching
its judgment); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 828 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 473 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (granting defer-
ence to factual conclusions by school districts about drug use among school children).
92. Turner, 564 U.S. at 448.
93. Id. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Court would require counsel to be
provided in all cases where the moving party is represented, even if counsel is appearing for a
state agency. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to appoint counsel for the defendant where the child protection agency was represented
by counsel, but “the case presented no especially troublesome points of law, either procedural or
substantive”).
94. Turner, 564 U.S. at 448–49.
95. Blackmun’s dissent in Lassiter notes that a proceeding with the following characteris-
tics is adversarial: “Notice and a trial-type hearing before the State on its own initia-
tive. . .[where] [t]he decisionmaker is a judge, the rules of evidence are in force, and the State is
represented by counsel.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. 37, 42–43. See also id. at 42–43 (comparing the
proceeding in Lassiter to a criminal proceeding, which is adversarial). In Turner, all but the last
characteristic (representation of the state or opposing party by counsel) was in place, albeit with
relaxed evidentiary rules in effect. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 449. Moreover, unlike in a termina-
tion of parental rights proceeding, where the burden of proof is on the state, the burden of proof
in a civil contempt case like Turner is on the defendant. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624,
637–641 (1988) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit placing the burden
of proof on the defendant in a civil contempt proceeding).
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ably weights the test against additional due process protection, while rein-
forcing a fallacy that public, private, and state interests are not in potential
conflict in the poor people’s courts.96
Second, the Court’s analysis in the due process cases minimizes the
role of the state and related power imbalances present in cases in the poor
people’s courts, reinforcing the fiction that the state is not involved in an
ostensibly private party case. This occurs both in how the Court character-
izes cases in terms of relative complexity, and when the court identifies the
case as involving state action. These are often interrelated issues. For exam-
ple, in the Court’s analysis, if the complexity of the case is limited, then
the potential benefit of additional protections is diminished.97 This ap-
proach disregards the ways in which the state controls the scope and com-
plexity of the cases before it, particularly those involving unrepresented
parties, who are typically not well equipped to defend their legal rights.98
In Lassiter, for example, the Court characterizes the case before it as
routine, due in part to the absence of expert witnesses.99 The Court then
relies on this characterization to determine that due process does not re-
quire the appointment of counsel in all termination of parental rights cases,
only those that are not routine.100 Yet, it is the agency or the court that
would likely call an expert witness, not the unrepresented, indigent parent
facing termination of parental rights, regardless of whether the parent
might actually benefit from such a witness. Moreover, given the odds
stacked against an unrepresented parent in a termination case, it is unlikely
that the agency would feel the need for expert testimony—or would
choose to up the ante by calling an expert given the Court’s indication
that doing so would require appointment of counsel for the defen-
96. Similarly, in Mathews, the Court granted deference to SSA procedures for termination
of benefits without an evidentiary hearing, despite evidence of high rates of reversal of termina-
tion decisions after trial. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 346 (putting the reversal rate at 60%); see also
Mashaw, supra note 82, at 38–39 (discussing calculation of termination reversals). See also Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty., 536 U.S. at 828 (2002); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 473, 515 U.S. at 652 (granting deference to factual conclusions by school districts about
drug use among school children, in a case reviewing the district’s safety-related procedures).
97. See, e.g., Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32–33 (holding counsel need not be appointed in a
routine termination of parental rights case).
98. See id. at 30 (observing that parents facing termination of parental rights cases tend to
have little education, have uncommon difficulty dealing with life, and are in a distressing and
disorienting situation). See also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of
Counsel in an Adversary System, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 509 (Kevin M. Clermont ed.,
2004) (describing the defendant in the Lassiter case). Thornburg writes, “Abby Gail Lassiter first
became a mother when she was fourteen years old. She was poor, black, single, and largely
uneducated. Juvenile court records suggest that she was of low intelligence.” Id.
99. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32–33.
100. Id.; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (characterizing medical evidence used in determining
ongoing eligibility for disability benefits as “routine, standard, and unbiased”). See also Turner,
564 U.S. at 446 (rationalizing that the case involves a “straightforward” question of the defen-
dant’s indigence).
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dant.101The Court’s approach disregards these inequalities of power be-
tween the state and unrepresented parties in controlling the litigation.102
The Court’s analysis also underestimates the level of state action in-
volved in proceedings in poor people’s courts. For example, in Turner, the
Court’s ruling specifically exempts circumstances where the government is
collecting child support owed for reimbursement of welfare payments
made to the child’s custodianand is represented by counsel. Thus, the
Court implies that the state was not involved in the case before it.103 How-
ever, unlike a traditional private party case initiated by a private litigant,
the family court clerk initiated the contempt proceedings in Turner, which
it did as a routine matter.104 Moreover, the family court judge actively
questioned and discussed the evidence with the unrepresented litigants
before him.105 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s ruling relies on an active role
for the state, requiring the family court to question the defendant in order
to discern the relevant facts, and to make express findings in the event that
counsel is not appointed.106 However, the issue triggering appeal in the
case (the incarceration of the defendant for twelve months without a find-
ing of ability to pay) also arose most directly from the actions of the trial
court judge, who demonstrated an alarming inability or unwillingness to
follow the law.107 Thus, the Court’s analysis also disregards the way the
state can (and did in Turner) operate to actively inhibit justice for
litigants.108
101. See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 98, at 503 (discussing the state’s case against Lassiter).
Moreover, the state can avoid formally calling expert witnesses by having social workers give
what amounts to expert opinion testimony and get away with it if the defendant does not have
the knowledge or wherewithal to object. See id. at 523–24 (explaining that the state’s only
witness in Lassiter, a social worker with limited knowledge of the case, gave her opinion that
termination of Lassiter’s parental rights was in her son’s best interest—a type of testimony that is
generally only permissible by a qualified expert).
102. In Mathews, the Court’s characterization of medical evidence also disregards the ways
in which seemingly objective, clinical-based decisionmaking incorporates subjective judgments,
especially in the disability determination processes set forth by the Social Security Act. See
Mashaw, supra note 82, at 41–42 (describing the disability determination process).
103. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 449.
104. Id. at 435–36.
105. Id. at 436–37 (describing the exchange between the judge and the parties).
106. Id. at 449. See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345 (noting in reaching its decision that due
process was not violated that the SSA provides individuals receiving disability benefits assistance
with completing questionnaires aimed at determining their continued eligibility for the
program).
107. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 437–38 (explaining that the trial court failed to make any
findings about the defendant’s ability to pay his arrearages, to ask any follow-up questions about
the issue, or to complete a prewritten “Order for Contempt of Court” form that provided boxes
for the judge to indicate whether the defendant was employed or had the ability to make support
payments).
108. See Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concep-
cion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158–59 (2012) (argu-
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Third, the Court’s reasoning in the due process cases disregards the
potential role of counsel in making delegalized forums more accountable
by bringing state practices that hurt poor people to light. It is true, as
noted earlier, that the informality of procedural rules creates challenges for
protecting rights through adversarial models, even for represented parties.
However, Turner illuminates the sorts of judicial misconduct that routinely
occur in courts where attorneys seldom appear, and its consequences.109
The failure of the Court to provide more robust procedural protections for
the poor in response to such misconduct reflects a persistent distortion,
manifest in governing decisions, of the role of advocacy for individuals
subject to state action.
Indeed, the Court’s due process analysis involves a pervasive assump-
tion that the presence of attorneys will hinder a tribunal in reaching fair
and timely decisions on the matters before it, particularly when only one
party is represented. For example, in Turner the Court asserts that appoint-
ment of counsel might “unduly slow payment [of child support] to those
in immediate need”, and “increase[e] the risk of a decision that would
erroneously deprive a family of the support it is entitled to receive.”110
How appointment of counsel might achieve undue delay or erroneous re-
sults is not explained. The assumption underlying adversarial process is that
a legal contest between equally armed opponents, represented by counsel,
will result in the presentation of the most complete body of relevant evi-
dence possible for the fact finder to reach a correct conclusion.111 It does
ing that the performance of the trial judge in Turner suggests the inadequacies of those
responsible for procedural fairness under the Supreme Court’s due process formulation). See also
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227,
1231–32 (2014) (questioning whether family courts have the ability to protect litigants’ due
process rights).
109. The potential for wrongful incarceration of child support obligors who, like the de-
fendant in Turner, cannot actually pay their arrears, is high. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 445 (ac-
knowledging that the vast majority of arrears are owed “by parents with either no reported
income or income of $10,000 per year or less”). See also Tonya Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Re-
thinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GEN-
DER RACE & JUST. 617, 646–47 (2012) (reporting that “[a]bout twenty-six percent of
noncustodial fathers (about 2.8 million) are poor, and the vast majority of this group (approxi-
mately eighty-eight percent) . . . earn an average of $5627 annually”). Brito cites to findings that
“sixty percent of poor fathers who do not pay child support are racial and ethnic minorities, and
twenty-nine percent were institutionalized (mostly in prison) at the time of interview.” Id. at
647. “Only forty-three percent of men not in prison were working, and those employed in 1996
worked an average of just twenty-nine weeks and earned $5,627 that year.” Id.
110. Turner, 564 U.S. at 447.
111. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (observing that “our
adversary system presupposes [that] accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained
through the equal contest of opposed interests). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
787–88 (1973) (noting, “lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and bound by profes-
sional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients’ positions
and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views”).
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not follow that the opposite result would occur where only one party is
represented, and thus the parties are unequally armed. Attorneys have a
duty of candor to tribunals in which they appear on behalf of a client.112
Moreover, the trial court must still make a determination based on admis-
sible evidence sufficient to make applicable findings of law and fact. Thus,
the court could presumably benefit from presentation of evidence by
counsel for the defendant, whose income is the pertinent issue, and who
bears the burden of proof.113 While participation of attorneys might con-
ceivably slow the resolution of certain types of cases, the Court in Turner
offers no evidence that this is an issue in child support cases.114 Moreover,
this goes to the speed with which the trial court can clear its docket, not its
accuracy in resolving cases.
It is worth reiterating here the context in which the Court’s analysis
occurs here: one in which large percentages of litigants (parents with child
support arrears) are indigent. It is hard to see how any increase in the time
needed for adjudication caused by additional procedural protections for
112. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also
id. r. 3.3 cmt. (explaining “although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to
present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the
lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that
the lawyer knows to be false”).
113. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983) (holding that the defendant in a
contempt action must overcome a presumption of his or her ability to comply with the court
order at issue). The Court’s analysis of procedural due process also distinguishes between infor-
mal and adversarial proceedings, and expresses the concern that the presence of counsel will alter
the nature of proceedings. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973)). In Gagnon, the court distinguished the role of the hearing body in probation revocation
matters from that of a judge at trial, characterizing the former’s role as “ ‘predictive and discre-
tionary’ as well as factfinding,” and focused on rehabilitative rather than retributivist concerns.
411 U.S. at 787. In that context, the court reasoned, the presence of counsel “will alter signifi-
cantly the nature of the proceeding.” Id. Expressing concern for the possibility of negative conse-
quences for probationers from more formal procedures, the uncontested nature of some
revocation proceedings (e.g., where the violation is admitted to by the defendant), and the in-
creased costs to the state of a blanket requirement for counsel, the court ruled that whether due
process required appointment of counsel in a probation revocation hearing depended on a case-
by-case analysis. Id. at 788. In contrast, the family court judge in Turner was in fact a trial judge
whose role as factfinder and responsibility for applying the law to the facts was neither predictive
nor discretionary, and this was true regardless of whether the parties were represented. Cf.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 43 (Blackmun J. dissenting) (distinguishing the adversary termination of
parental rights proceeding from the proceeding in Gagnon). However, in rather circular logic, the
court seems to characterize the nature of the proceeding based in part on the presence or absence
of counsel. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976) (characterizing the steps
leading up to termination of disability benefits as non-adversarial based in part on the SSA not
being represented by counsel). The characterization of administrative proceedings as non-adver-
sarial when the agency is not represented by counsel is now codified in the federal Equal Access
to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
114. See, e.g., D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Random-
ized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901
(2013) (reporting the impacts of counsel on the speed with which the court resolved cases).
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indigent defendants would unduly delay collection of support owed to
needy families. If the court’s docket were slowed, however, it might serve
to highlight the unworkability of current child support policies in a way
that got the attention of state officials.115 Moreover, while the presence of
counsel does not mean that the defendant’s procedural due process rights
are guaranteed, the routine absence of counsel or other effective advocacy
for poor litigants leaves state power unchecked. Alternative procedural
safeguards provided by the state, such as those recommended by the Court
in Turner, do not necessarily provide this power-checking function.116 In
fact, alternatives to representation may allow for the appearance of meeting
legal needs while falling short of countering the subordinating impacts of
poor people’s courts.117 For that matter, given the insufficient resources
provided to publicly funded legal aid and the inadequacies of traditional
approaches to legal representation, even providing counsel, as important a
role as representation can play, may have the same effect.118
Nonetheless, the Court’s approach obscures the relationship between
court practices and regulation of the poor, and the potential for advocacy
that effectively challenges state power. The result is to encourage the illu-
sion that process dangers and abuses are not endemic to the poor people’s
courts, and that access to justice interventions of any kind do not, there-
fore, have to account for state power in order to be effective. The next
Section develops a theoretical framework to counter this approach and lays
the groundwork for a new theory of access to justice. The point of this
theory is to better account for the structural dimensions of advocacy for
poor people. That will require more than attorneys; it will require a differ-
ent perspective on the purpose and potential of access to justice.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Fragmented State
Political scientist John Hagan originally proffered the concept of the
fragmented state within a structural-contextual theory of criminal jus-
tice.119 In this view, state apparatuses consist of macro and micro-level
115. See Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon, supra note 89, at 704–06 (arguing
that access to justice strategies must take into account the self-interests of court staff and other
stakeholders in order to effectuate desired change; only if the status quo becomes too onerous
will courts and others embrace change).
116. See Judith Resnick, Fairness in Numbers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158 (2011) (noting
the lack of empirical evidence about the costs or efficacy of alternative procedural safeguards).
117. See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Domestic Violence and the Politics of Self-Help, 22 WM &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 244–252 (2016) [hereinafter MacDowell, Politics of Self-Help] (de-
tailing how self-help staff members regulate litigants and restrict access to remedies).
118. See MacDowell, Reimagining, supra note 8, at 504–10 (describing the limitations of
current access to justice models).
119. Hagan, supra note 14, at 110–11. Others theorists have described or conceptualized
the state as consisting of multiple parts and functions. These include Martha Fineman, whose
2017-2018] The Fragmented State 73
subsystems that are loosely coordinated, often in conflict, and highly re-
sponsive to political forces.120 The tendency of the system is to remain
loosely coupled unless and until political goals (emanating from within or
outside a given apparatus) result in a tightening—characterized as greater
coordination among the system’s constituent parts—in order to achieve
the desired ends.121 The result of tightening is a shift from unpredictability
and seemingly random consequences to “an increase [in] the certainty of
outcomes” for targeted groups.122
Importantly, Hagan found that tightening across criminal justice op-
erations in highly politicized settings have “ominous implications” for
targets of the (now more highly coordinated) state.123 Hagan associates this
phenomenon with the “new penology”: a shift from “an individualized
conception of justice that is characteristic of loosely coupled system opera-
tions. . . .[to] a concentration on subgroups or aggregations of individuals
and their risks of crime, which are to be managed efficiently by means of
selective incapacitation.”124 Hagan argues that “[t]he italicized terms form
the language of a new penology that is used to target categories and sub-
populations rather than individuals for penal attention,” including young
Black males targeted by the War on Drugs.125 Thus, the theory suggests
the structural mechanisms through which varying levels of state domina-
tion occurs.
Hagan’s theory has been proposed as a framework for explaining op-
erations across as well as within systems (for example, across the legal sys-
tem and the welfare system).126 It was also used by political scientist
Elizabeth Ben-Ishai to theorize about opportunities for advocacy and ac-
tivism within criminal legal systems by non-governmental community ac-
tors.127 This formulation is particularly instructive for thinking about
access to justice efforts more broadly.
vulnerability thesis—which I discuss next—understands the state as consisting of “intersecting
and overlapping” parts. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Re-
sponsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 269 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive State]. Political
theorist Michel Foucault might go farther and object to use of the term “state” at all, referring
instead to the conditions of which I speak as problems of “governmentality”, which is inherently
diffuse in nature. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUD-
IES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 103–04 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., Rosi Braidotti trans., 1991)
(describing the modern state form as “a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction”).
120. Hagan, supra note 14, at 110–12.
121. Id. at 122.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasis in original).
125. Id.
126. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 14, at 307.
127. Id. at 313.
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Ben-Ishai is one of the many scholars who have weighed in on the
impacts of mandatory arrest and prosecution schemes on domestic vio-
lence survivors; she was particularly concerned about the potential impacts
of mandatory policies on survivors’ autonomy.128 Using Hagan’s theory
(as adopted by sociologist Lynne Haney), Ben-Ishai opined that “coordi-
nated fragmentation” within the state allows for creative service provision
on behalf of battered women, such as that provided by “coordinated com-
munity response” (“CCR”) programs.129 Services provided through CCR
programs, she contends, mitigate against the impartiality of mandatory
schemes and their potentially autonomy-inhibiting effects of mandatory
schemes in at least three ways. First, CCR programs allow advocates to
support victims during their engagement with the state (for example, dur-
ing encounters with police and prosecutors) and help maintain focus on
their safety.130 Second, they allow advocates to educate state actors about
the dynamics of abuse that impact victims’ behavior, such as the desire to
return to the abuser and drop the case, which (absent advocacy) leads pros-
ecutors and others to view battered women as “bad victims.”131 In this
role, CCR program advocates help contextualize the experiences of indi-
vidual women within larger issues of gender inequality.132 Third, CCR
programs facilitate coordination among arms of the state with different
functions that, absent coordinated service provision, can be exploited by
batterers to the detriment of victims.133 In other words, the CCR pro-
grams help bridge a fragmented system, and exploit fragmentation to
achieve advocacy goals.
Ben-Ishai also believes coordination creates the potential for “imma-
nent self-critique” within the system—a type of institutionalized feedback
loop between differing perspectives that reside within a fragmented
state.134 These perspectives include those within the legal system requiring
greater impartiality, and those belonging to “arms of the state that are
outside the ‘ethic of justice’.”135 In her view, feedback among these parts
holds the potential to make the overall system more sympathetic and re-
sponsive to women’s needs. This potential for productive critique is made
possible by both the existence of fragmentation in the state, and the pres-
ence of “outsiders” in the system who strategically represent a different
viewpoint—in this case, the CCR program.136 Thus, the benefits of coor-
128. Id. at 315–17 (detailing feminist analyses of the impact of mandatory policies on sur-
vivor autonomy).
129. Id. at 317.
130. Id. at 325.
131. Id. at 313–14.
132. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 14, at 314.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 323.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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dinated fragmentation to battered women, in Ben-Ishai’s view, depend on
a careful balance wherein advocates have access to state actors in critical
positions and can influence their views, yet neither representatives of the
state nor advocates are coopted to the other’s viewpoint.137
This analysis must be contrasted with the extensive critique of service
providers who engage with the state. First, critical race feminists and
others have shown how such state-engaged efforts to provide services to
battered women are often not particular enough.138 This critique holds
that feminists in these partnerships fail to adequately represent the interests
of women of color, who suffer disproportionately from the negative im-
pacts of mandatory policies and other more generalized responses.139 Sec-
ond, activists and researchers report that state systems often impact
partnering service providers in negative ways (for example, consuming re-
sources and compromising missions, as system concerns supplant partiality
for battered women) while doing little to change the state response.140
Third, to the extent that arms of the state adopt feminist ideologies about
domestic violence, they may do so selectively to further their own aims,
which may not coincide with those of battered women.141 As a result,
CCR programs may allow the coordinated state to both tighten (around a
shared ideology and narrative about abuse) and extend its grip (into civil
society) in a way that further marginalizes particularly affected survivors
(and defendants), while appearing responsive to community input.
The main point is not that Ben-Ishai might be too optimistic in her
analysis of CCR programs. Her insight about the ways that fragmentation
can be exploited to benefit outsiders engaging the state is a critical one.
The spaces within the fragmented state (including those created by differ-
ing or conflicting viewpoints) create opportunities for strategic action on
behalf of marginalized people. The question is under what conditions such
efforts might succeed with the least unintended negative consequences.
Ben-Ishai’s focus on issues of partiality and impartiality suggests the impor-
tant relationship of fragmentation to the roles of system participants and
their ability to carry out their functions.
137. Id. at 327–28.
138. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1246–50 (1991) (explaining the impor-
tance of examining intersections of race, gender, and immigration status in developing domestic
violence laws, services, and policies).
139. Id. See also Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 811 (2001) (describing how a lack of insight
about the experiences of low-income women of color results in harmful policies).
140. Ellen Pence, Advocacy on Behalf of Battered Women, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 329, 336 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001).
141. Id. at 335 (describing how engagement with the criminal justice system by advocates
for abuse survivors ultimately benefited law enforcement agencies and prosecutors).
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For example, returning to Hagan’s analysis of tightening in the crim-
inal legal system in response to political pressure, we can notice that
heightened coordination among police, prosecutors, and judges calls into
question whether these linked subsystems of law enforcement, executive,
and judiciary functions are exercising their duties with appropriate inde-
pendence. Thus, an important question is how to distinguish among types
of fragmentation for the purpose of advocating for marginalized commu-
nities—what linkages are helpful, which are problematic; how much coor-
dination or detachment is productive in a given context? The central issues
involved in answering these questions arise at what can be characterized as
the nexus of institutional and human vulnerabilities.
B. Vulnerability Theory
Vulnerability theory derives from legal theorist Martha Fineman’s ef-
forts to provide a more egalitarian and holistic alternative to the classic
“autonomous liberal subject” of liberal political theory; one which would
justify a strong, responsive, and accountable state. Fineman argues that “by
relying on the myth of the autonomous individual, the formal equality
model fails to address substantive inequalities and differential allocations of
privilege produced by our institutions.”142 Therefore, Fineman advocates
for a new view of the human legal subject: an embodied individual who
faces a life trajectory inevitably marked by biological vulnerability (includ-
ing infancy, old age and death, and the possibility of illness) and the other
multiple forms of harm that can befall one during a lifetime (including
social, economic, and environmental harm).143 These shared vulnerabili-
ties interact with one another to produce additional, complex forms of
vulnerability, which vary among individuals and social groups. Fineman
notes that vulnerability is thus universal, constant, and complex. But vul-
nerability is also, paradoxically, particular in nature. This is true because,
“our individual experience of vulnerability varies according to the quality
and quantity of resources we possess or can command.”144 Moreover, be-
cause it cannot be eradicated, human vulnerability requires a strong state to
“mediate, compensate, and lessen our vulnerability through programs, in-
stitutions, and structures.”145
As Fineman explains, “Vulnerability is posited as the characteristic
that positions us in relation to each other as human beings and also suggests
a relationship of responsibility between state and individual. The nature of
human vulnerability forms the basis for a claim that the state must be more
142. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Human Condition].
143. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 119, at 267–68.
144. Id. at 269.
145. Id.
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responsive to that vulnerability.”146 However, Fineman views societal and
state institutions as vulnerable as well. This includes institutional vulnera-
bility “to a variety of internal and external corruptions and disruptions,
and this realization is the basis for the further claim that these institutions
must be actively monitored by the state in processes that are both transpar-
ent and inclusive.”147
Vulnerability theorists conceive of resources to combat vulnerability
as “assets.”148 Cumulatively, assets constitute our resilience, which is our
ability to combat vulnerability and address misfortune.149 Drawing on the
work of political economist Peadar Kirby, Fineman identifies three kinds
of assets, provided by institutions, that are sources of support and strength:
physical assets (those that “impart physical or material goods through the
distribution of wealth and property”), human assets (innate and developed
assets, such as those pertaining to health and education), and social assets
(including cultural networks such as family and political associations such
as trade unions and political parties).150 These assets have both present
value in terms of our quality of life, and future value in the sense that they
help determine our ability to collect material resources and our future re-
silience in the face of vulnerability.151
In this regard, vulnerability theorists recognize that individuals and
groups have differing levels of vulnerability and assets due to personal cir-
cumstances and conditions of societal discrimination, including those
based on race and gender. As Fineman describes, “Important to the con-
sideration of privilege is the fact that these systems [of discrimination]
interact in ways that further affect these inequalities. Privileges and disad-
vantages accumulate across systems and can combine to create effects that
are more devastating or more beneficial than the weight of each separate
part.”152 However, Fineman advocates vigorously for replacing identity
categories like race and gender with what she views as the more universal
experience of vulnerability. In her view, the universality of human vulner-
ability is more descriptively accurate than identity, and more strategically
useful. “Sometimes privileges conferred within certain systems,” Fineman
writes, “can mediate or even cancel out disadvantages conferred in others.
A good early education may triumph poverty, particularly when coupled
with a supportive family and progressive social network.”153 She con-
cludes, therefore, that “with respect to the assets any one person possesses,
146. Id. at 255–56.
147. Id. at 256.
148. Fineman, Human Condition, supra note 142, at 13.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 13–14.
151. Id. at 14.
152. Id. at 15.
153. Fineman, Human Condition, supra note 148, at 15–16.
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it is not multiple identities that intersect to produce compounded inequali-
ties, as has been posited by some theorists, but rather systems of power and
privilege that interact to produce webs of advantages and disadvantages.”
In her view, then, what is imperative is to account not for “multiple inter-
secting identities,” but for “the institutional practices that produce the
identities and inequalities in the first place.”154
Vulnerability theory offers a number of benefits to analyzing struc-
tural inequality in institutional contexts. Vulnerability theorists’ focus on
institutions contextualizes and concretizes the analysis of how inequality
and power operates. The focus on shared (institutionally created) vulnera-
bilities may also lend itself to coalition-building as we move toward solu-
tions.155 However, Fineman’s “post-identity” approach to theorizing state
responses to inequality has some weaknesses. First, it does not tell us how
to prioritize our response to different vulnerabilities. Are all vulnerabilities
equally important? Or is there a starting point that makes more sense?
Second, it does not suggest an appropriate response by the state to vulnera-
bility. Indeed, the perception of vulnerability can lead to responses that
reinforce inequalities.156 In the context of family courts, for example, we
have seen that the perceived vulnerability of children to abuse, neglect, and
poverty has supported policies resulting in the disproportionate removal of
poor children of color from their homes and the incarceration of their
fathers for child support arrears. Moreover, calls for a strong state may help
justify making courts responsible for securing access to justice interests
when, as we have seen, they have a weak interest in protecting the rights of
unrepresented litigants.
Two interventions have been suggested to address these issues. First,
legal scholar Frank Rudy Cooper argues for a modification of vulnerability
theory to incorporate the theory of relative privilege.157 As discussed
above, Fineman includes the notion of privilege in her articulation of vul-
nerability theory.158 But she does so through her emphasis on how social
institutions contribute to relative vulnerability.159 In contrast, Cooper ad-
vocates for a notion of relative privilege based on intersecting identities
such as race and gender that travel with individuals across institutional rela-
154. Id. at 16.
155. Id. at 17; Cooper, supra note 29, at 1371, 1377.
156. Kohn, supra note 29 at 14–21 (analyzing suggested reforms to old age polices).
157. Cooper adopts Stephanie Wildman’s definition of privilege as “a special advantage,
immunity, permission, right, or benefit granted to or enjoyed by an individual, class, or caste.”
Cooper, supra note 29, at 1345–46 (citing STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED:
HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 13 (1996), quoted in Danielle Kie Hart,
Revealing Privilege—Why Bother, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 131, 134 (2013).
158. See supra notes 158–60 and surrounding text.
159. Id. See also Fineman, Human Condition, supra note 142, at 16 (arguing that a focus on
how institutions confer privilege will allow for a more “complex and particular” analysis than
can be obtained with a focus on “identity and discrimination”).
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tionships through social norms.160 Without acknowledging how identities
inform social norms as well as institutional practices, Cooper argues, vul-
nerability theory loses coherence and explanatory power to describe the
cumulative impacts of intersecting systems.161 By way of example, he ana-
lyzes American policing practices, showing that the invisible way that so-
cial norms operate renders African American males “always already
suspect” to police.162 Because of social norms, the disproportionate target-
ing of young Black men by police seems perfectly rational, and—validated
by higher arrest rates of Blacks than Whites—makes sense. Cooper argues
that to address all the ways that inequality is reproduced through identity-
based norms, vulnerability theory should incorporate an understanding of
how identities are differently privileged in various contexts and settings.163
Such an understanding would help explain, for example, how aggressive
law enforcement programs like broken windows policing tend to result in
high arrest rates of young Black men.
A second intervention into vulnerability theory, proposed by legal
scholar Nina Kohn, is to take autonomy into account. Kohn argues that
“Fineman’s concern about privileging autonomy is a concern about . . .
allow[ing] individuals to behave in ways that have negative externalities or
perpetuate resource imbalances.”164 Thus, Kohn believes it is consistent
with vulnerability theory to value preserving autonomy when to do so
does not involve these types of negative consequences. Feminist concepts
of autonomy help support this view. Unlike the independent liberal sub-
ject, feminist accounts view autonomy as developed “in the context of
relations to others”, and as subject to constraint.165 Ben-Ishai, for example,
adopts feminist philosopher Marilyn Friedman’s definition of autonomy as
a person with the capacities for autonomy that exercises them at least occa-
sionally.166 Legal theorist Kathryn Abrams goes further, preferring the
term “agency” to distinguish her conception from the liberal subject, and
the conceptions of other (liberal) feminists who in her view utilize too
great a degree of individualism in their articulations of autonomy. While
retaining the concept of self-definition and self-direction in liberal feminist
theory, Abrams further “understand[s] agency to emerge in a context of
group-based oppressions,” and describes “such agency as emerging
160. Cooper, supra note 29, at 1372 (noting that “identities have themselves been a means
of distributing resources that cut across social institutions”).
161. Id. at 1364–65 (describing why the problem of racial profiling cannot be adequately
explained without identities).
162. Id. at 1363–64.
163. Id. at 1373.
164. Kohn, supra note 29, at 22.
165. Ben-Ishai, supra note 14, at 310.
166. Id.
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through collective action as well as individual self-reflection, and being
directed toward cultural and political, as well as individual targets.”167
It is important to note in this context the potentially protective func-
tions of privacy as well as autonomy. Privacy doctrines and concepts have
rightly been criticized, especially by feminists, for shielding privilege (for
example, of men and parents) and fostering subordination (such as of
women and children). However, more recently, some theorists have distin-
guished the role of privacy when used to cloak privilege from situations
where it protects subordinated groups from the state, and from subordinat-
ing private relationships. For example, legal scholar Suzanne Kim describes
how judicial recognition of privacy can protect battered women from child
welfare officials by insulating their decision-making about how to best pro-
tect themselves and their children from abuse.168 Applying privacy doc-
trine in this way, a federal district court found that a child welfare agency’s
routine removal of children from low-income mothers who were seeking
help for domestic violence violated the mothers’ constitutional rights.169
Kim concludes that there is a role for privacy doctrines in providing a
protective space for women.170 Similarly, Fineman has observed that
“[s]ome concept of privacy is necessary for resisting assertions about the
appropriateness of collective control.”171 Indeed, there cannot be auton-
omy without privacy. Fineman calls for a reconceptualization of family
privacy that would focus on function rather than form, and “would not be
a right to separation, secrecy, or seclusion, but rather the right to auton-
omy or self-determination for the family, even as it is firmly located within
a supportive and reciprocal state.”172 Such a formulation would address
concerns about models for privacy that leave vulnerable family members
under-protected.
Putting these interventions together and folding them into vulnera-
bility theory, I would further argue that both institutions and human be-
ings are relatively privileged in terms of the distribution of assets and thus
have greater and lesser degrees of resilience. This is not to equate the oper-
ation of identity-based social norms for humans with the conditions of
inequality among institutions. But, in order to fully analyze, prioritize, and
devise interventions meant to address vulnerability, the relative privilege
and inequality between institutions (for example, courts and NGOs) must
167. Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 806–07 (1999). Fineman herself has acknowledged the desirability
of autonomy in the carrying out of family functions. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 294 (2004) [hereinafter AUTONOMY MYTH]
(calling for the protection of family functions, not form).
168. See Kim, supra note 59, at 565–66.
169. See id. at 565.
170. See id. at 593.
171. FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 167, at 293.
172. Id. at 294.
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also be taken into account. Taking relative privilege seriously also requires
analyzing vulnerability in a context-specific manner.173 This specificity
should include the value of autonomy for individuals and groups, espe-
cially those for whom autonomy has historically been limited.174 The im-
pact of institutions on autonomy in the context of relative privilege is
therefore an important consideration.
Using this modified vulnerability theory in conjunction with insights
of the fragmented, interlocking state we can move toward a working the-
ory of functional fragmentation. This theory understands the propensity of
legal institutions, made up of linked subsystems and involving linkages
with other arms of the state and NGOs, to tighten in response to political
pressures, including those emanating from or bolstered by the perception
that vulnerable populations require access to legal remedies. Furthermore,
this tightening may result in an increase of coercive state power being di-
rected at targeted individuals, including those whom the intervention is
intended to help; it may also result in the erosion of advocacy support from
NGOs for targeted populations. This tendency to tighten and its conse-
quences are the result of institutional vulnerabilities, including those that
threaten institutional roles. This includes cooptation; it also includes belief
in the problem-solving court paradigm itself, with its attendant conviction
that courts can and should solve social problems.
The next Section applies this theoretical framework to further
deconstruct the dynamics of fragmentation within problem-solving courts.
This Part shows how reduced fragmentation, or tightening, is implicated in
the exercise of state power over low-income litigants in these settings.
III. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
A. Reduced Fragmentation Within Systems
1. System Roles
In an adversarial context, the resolution of disputes is through a pro-
cess designed to discover the truth of the relevant facts and their legal sig-
nificance. The onus is on the parties to raise and shape the issues of the
case through legal argument and factual development;175 the role of the
judge is one of impartial arbiter and fact finder.176 In contrast, the
173. See Fineman, Human Condition, supra note 142, at 25–26.
174. See Abrams, supra note 167, at 805 (calling for more empirically grounded claims
about how autonomy actually manifests and functions).
175. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64
IND. L. J.301, 301–02 (1988) (describing the value of party control in adversary proceedings);
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 382 (1982); Amanda Frost, The Limits
of Advocacy, 59 DUKE  L.J. 447, 457–58 (2009).
176. See STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2–4 (1988); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1038 (1975) (explaining the norm of the uninvolved and impar-
tial factfinder).
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problems that come before delegalized courts are understood as primarily
social—not legal—in nature.177 In this context, the roles of the judge and
the parties are transformed. Rather than a neutral arbiter in a largely latent
role, dependent on the parties to develop the facts, the problem-solving
court judge is an impassioned participant in a highly interactive process.178
Instead of being more or less limited to the information provided by the
parties or their lawyers, the judge is privy to information provided by
others such as caseworkers, therapists, and recovery treatment providers.179
Moreover, the judge may receive this information before disposition of the
case and subject it to lower evidentiary standards.180 The goal of the pro-
ceeding is not to discover truth through contest, per se, but for one or
both parties to accept and internalize a desired social role.181 For the par-
ties, this not only erodes their traditional roles as opposing contestants in a
battle for truth, but also complicates their ability to protect or enforce their
respective rights.
One way of looking at this situation, from an access to justice stand-
point, is that problem-solving courts are characterized by reduced frag-
mentation, or tightening, that occurs through the collapse or elimination
of roles that can be beneficial to advocacy for poor people. These roles
include those of the primary participants in the adversary system: the im-
partial judge and the parties opposing one another—whether represented
by lawyers or appearing pro se. Such roles are reconfigured in problem-
solving courts as parts of a team, which may include additional supporting
parts, including social workers and other professionals.182 As noted previ-
ously, all of these roles are vulnerable to cooptation or corruption.183
Delegalization of the fact-finding process exacerbates this vulnerability. In-
deed, one function of due process norms within the legal system is to help
maintain the roles associated with the coordinated but fragmented state.
The availability of those protections gives substance to defense counsels’
role as an advocate and places limits on those participants representing the
state. Problem-solving courts not only reduce the availability of due pro-
177. See supra Part I.A.
178. RACHEL PORTER ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES A COURT
PROBLEM-SOLVING?: UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUS-
TICE 13 (2010), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/What_Makes_A_Court_P_
S.pdf, (citing “a proactive and interactive judge” as one of four critical factors distinguishing
problem-solving courts from ordinary courts).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-solving Judges and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and United Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV. 82, 96
(2006) (noting that “problem-solving judges are concerned not merely with resolving disputes or
assigning responsibility but with achieving desirable behavioral change”).
182. See id. (discussing the team aspect of problem solving court case management); see also
supra Part I.A. (identifying the components of delegalization).
183. See supra Part II.A.
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cess protections, but also dissuade litigants from asserting what rights they
may have by discouraging rights talk.184 Indeed, rights talk is antithetical to
the problem-solving court model, and can lead to harsher treatment for
those who fail to pay heed, whether or not they have a lawyer.185 This
undercutting of due process norms also exacerbates the problem of gender
and racial bias in problem-solving courts.186 That parties can suffer (or
benefit) from race and gender bias in adversarial systems is without ques-
tion.187 However, such biases are not subject to adversarial testing in prob-
lem-solving courts to the same extent they would be otherwise, due to the
combined effects of diminished procedural protections.
As we saw, one avenue for bias to enter the court unchallenged is the
involvement of social workers and other “helping professionals.” Family
court judges, for example, rely on mediators to settle cases and psycholo-
gists and social workers to investigate custody disputes.188 In some jurisdic-
tions, even mediators—who normally operate as “neutrals” and do not
take sides in a case—provide their opinion on custody outcomes to the
judge when the parties do not settle during the mandatory mediation ses-
sion.189 In criminal problem-solving courts, helping professionals enter the
equation as part of diversion or sentencing, and sometimes as a condition
of release from pre-trial detention.190 In each of these examples, the result
is the same: helping professionals are absorbed into the adjudicatory sys-
tem, transforming it in the process. Specifically, the roles of these profes-
sionals are merged with the judicial function.
In the civil system, judges in most cases will order whatever the eval-
uating professional recommends, essentially eliminating the distinction be-
tween helping professionals and the judge.191 Similarly, compliance with
ordered treatment is a condition for successful resolution of diversion in a
criminal case.192 At the same time, the role of counsel is hampered by
procedures that allow for the introduction of hearsay and opinion evidence
184. Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare
Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 343–44 (1999).
185. See id. at 355 (discussing how a parent’s perceived failure to be cooperative leads to
negative perceptions of parenting in family court).
186. See supra Part II.A.
187. See MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity, supra note 70, at 541 (describing how
racial and gender bias can hurt or help parties in domestic violence cases).
188. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 184, at 353 (describing influence of social workers in
family law cases).
189. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3183 (West 2011) (called “reporting counties” in California).
190. See Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice:” The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and
the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 31–33 (2006) (describ-
ing a deferred sentencing program).
191. See Sinden, supra note 184, at 353 (describing how judges defer to case workers).
192. See Meekins, supra note 190, at 18–21 (explaining the operation of diversion
programs).
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that cannot be easily challenged.193 These arrangements reduce fragmenta-
tion and tighten linkages among arms and subsystems of the state.194
Tightening also results from the complex functions of ideology and partial-
ity associated with problem-solving courts.
2. Ideology
While problem-solving courts vary by specialization, internally they
share the dynamic of reduced fragmentation within their constituent parts
based on the shared belief that modifications to adversarial processes are
necessary. In addition to expression through procedures that allow for in-
formalism and interventionism, this ideology is expressed through lan-
guage and rhetoric. The specific expression of ideology depends on the
specialization of the court. However, the function overall is to increase
tightening by knitting system participants together in particular ways.
Martha Fineman provides an example of this dynamic in her influential
article, Dominant Discourse: Professional Language and Legal Change, which
describes the operation of social work discourse in family courts.195
As Fineman explains, social work discourse has informed contempo-
rary interpretations of the “best interests of the child” standard that governs
custody decisions.196 While judges have used the standard since the nine-
teenth century, Fineman argues that its inherently indeterminate nature
was initially limited by two factors: the presumption that mothers were the
best custodians for young children and the influence of fault-based divorce
rules on custody decisions.197 By the midtwentieth century, however, gen-
der-based presumptions gave way to gender-neutral standards, and most
states replaced their fault-based regime with no-fault divorce.198 In this
shifting landscape, Fineman credits social work ideology with redefining
the divorce experience. Whereas previously social work had viewed di-
vorce as something to be discouraged through focused efforts at reconcilia-
tion, contemporary social work theories understood divorce as a crisis
requiring family reorganization.199 This redefinition changed the concep-
193. See Sinden, supra note 184, at 349 (noting that many states allow hearsay evidence to
be admitted into evidence in family court proceedings).
194. In some cases, these linkages are also between the state and nongovernmental service
and treatment providers. See Meekins, supra note 190, at 29–30, n.142 (discussing problems
associated with privatization of state mandated services).
195. See generally Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Dis-
course in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988) [hereinafter Fineman,
Dominant Discourse].
196. See id. at 742.
197. See id. at 741–43; see generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (G. Edward White ed.,1985) (dis-
cussing the rise of the best interest standard in the 19thCentury).
198. See Fineman, Dominant Discourse, supra note 195, at 744.
199. See id. at 744–45.
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tualization of the family court’s role (at least when children were involved)
from a legal experience involving the severing of legal ties to one of man-
aging ongoing relationships within families engaged in a process of recon-
stituting themselves.200 As Fineman describes:
In this framework, the role of the system is to be therapeutic to
facilitate and assist the family in adapting to a new post-divorce
family structure. Attorneys, in this context, are viewed as ill-
equipped to handle the crisis because of their adversarial orien-
tation and the ways in which they impede or defeat the thera-
peutic ideal. By contrast, social workers and others in the
helping professions are in possession or control of the therapeu-
tic process.201
In Fineman’s view, the direct result of this take-over included crea-
tion of the “mediation ideal” and preferences for joint custody, both of
which expanded the role of social work and other “helping professions” in
divorce cases.202 However, her focus on divorce emphasizes changes affect-
ing the middle class and misses the earlier, related developments in
DRCs—and their influence on divorce courts in jurisdictions where di-
vorce was separated from issues such as nonsupport and paternity.203 Thus,
while she is correct in identifying the central role of social work ideology
in helping to construct and justify the problem-solving court enterprise,
her account underplays judges’ ready adoption of therapeutic ideologies as
a mode for expanding, not ceding, their fact-finding abilities and overall
discretionary power.204
The family court bench is not alone in expanding its reach—and
thus, the reach of the state— through multi-disciplinarianism. The devel-
opment of drug, mental health, and other problem-solving courts demon-
strates the close relationship of problem-solving courts to related treatment
conventions. Moreover, the shared nature of ideology within problem-
solving courts dampens whatever creative or productive differences might
arise from the multidisciplinary setting.205 This shared ideology, insofar as
200. Id. at 745.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 743. Social work ideology also worked to expand (and itself reflected) the influ-
ence of father’s rights groups on shared parenting norms. See id. at 758.
203. See supra Part I.A (describing the DRCs).
204. See supra Part I.A.
205. Law professor Melissa Breger argues that the melding of perspectives within family
courts court leads to systemic decisional weakness called “groupthink”. Breger, supra note 55, at
55–56. The antecedents of groupthink, which Breger finds prevalent in family courts, are: group
cohesiveness; an insular environment and lack of impartial leadership and methodologies, social
and ideological homogeneity; and “a provocative situational context, which often encompasses
high external stress and moral dilemmas.” Id. at 60. Breger also identifies the following
groupthink symptoms: “(1) overestimation of the group’s invulnerability or belief in inherent
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it is anti-legalistic and anti-adversarial, also plays a part in undermining
procedural due process.
First and most obviously, commitments to individual rights are sus-
pect in an anti-adversarial regime. As noted above, this suppresses the as-
sertion and protection of rights. Second, in the ideologically charged
environment of a problem-solving court, the commitment is to something
other than the integrity of the adversarial process; it is to solving what is
perceived as the problem underlying the case. In this context, the goals of
the problem-solving court broaden beyond the legally dispositive facts of a
given case in a potentially limitless way. As a drug court judge and leader
in the problem-solving court movement described, “We’re not just look-
ing at the offense any more. We’re looking more and more at the best
interests, not just of the defendant, but of the defendant’s family and the
community.”206 Thus, invoking Hagan’s discussion of “the new penol-
ogy,” the problem-solving court model not only expands on what issues
will be adjudicated, but moves past individual cases to classes of persons, or
targets.
3. Targets
The problem-solving court requires a population with a problem. As
we have seen, proponents of these courts seek to address what are viewed
as social rather than legal problems; they also respond to what are viewed as
problems with adversarial systems for particular types of cases or groups.207
Thus, in family courts, the needs of unrepresented litigants and children
have justified and fueled reform movements, along with belief in the so-
cializing influence of the court for low-income populations.208 In the
criminal legal system, groups considered especially undeserving of a puni-
tive response due to their status (such as veterans, addicts, youthful first-
time offenders, and the mentally ill) and/or type of offense (primarily non-
violent offences) are redirected toward courts that offer treatment in ex-
change for deferred sentencing or other alternative sentencing
arrangements.209 These criminal courts, too, are fueled by a belief that
courts can and should fix social problems like addiction and domestic vio-
morality and insulation of the group from the judgments of outsiders; (2) close-minded, stereo-
typed images of outgroups; and (3) pressure towards uniformity or the leader’s promotion of her
preferred solution.” Id. at 62.
206. Colloquium, What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?: Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84
JUDICATURE 78, 80 (2000).
207. See supra Part I.A (describing rationales for DRCs).
208. Id.
209. See JANE DONOGHUE, TRANSFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE?: PROBLEM-SOLVING
AND COURT SPECIALISATION 8 (2014) (noting the critique that “the most sympathetic and
appealing class of criminal cases are isolated for attention” in problem-solving courts, while more
challenging and complex cases are given insufficient resources).
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lence, in addition to addressing crime.210 In this way, problem-solving
courts remain dependent on the idea of a needful population toward
whom the court’s activities are directed.
Some theorists, such as sociologist James Nolan, have focused on the
way in which problem-solving courts use the vulnerability of target popu-
lations to justify therapeutic intervention, in the mode of Foucauldian
governmentality.211 In this mode, the state extends its reach through the
characterization of individuals as victims rather than as bad actors or sin-
ners, such as in the illness model of addiction that underlies drug courts.212
Others argue that problem-solving courts also engage in practices geared
toward the more traditional criminal justice goal of individual accountabil-
ity, and—more radically—social change. For example, sociologist Rekha
Mirchandani argues that practices she observed among judges in a domes-
tic violence court, including public shaming of defendants, are aimed at
challenging social attitudes about patriarchy among spectators in the court-
room audience as well as encouraging defendants to take responsibility for
their conduct.213
A more comprehensive view, I suggest, is that problem-solving
courts engage in all of these modes of state action, which need not be
mutually exclusive. For example, the judges in Mirchandani’s study also
engaged in the common practice of sentencing defendants to batterer in-
tervention classes, demonstrating therapeutic as well as personal accounta-
bility and social change goals.214 Similarly, recent developments in child
support enforcement include alternative sentencing schemes that require
defendants with arrears to attend court-ordered vocational and parenting
classes, and offer voluntary drug treatment and other services.215 The
group nature of these programs, where defendants believed to share similar
issues are placed together for classes or training, underscores the fact that
210. See Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 258 (2008) (noting
that “[a]ll of the [problem-solving] court professionals are committed to resolving the underly-
ing problems that bring the litigants to court”). See also Morris B. Hoffman, Problem-Solving
Courts and the Psycholegal Error, 160 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 129, 134–38 (2011) (describing the
belief of problem-solving court judges that they can solve social or personal problems from the
bench as a form of misguided, wishful thinking).
211. See generally JAMES L. NOLAN, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT
AT CENTURY’S END (1998).
212. Others note such interventions also allow the state to widen its net by focusing on
lower level offenses. See DONOGHUE, supra note 209, at 8 (summarizing critiques).
213. Rekha Mirchandani, Beyond Therapy: Problem-Solving Courts and the Deliberative Demo-
cratic State, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 880 (2008) (hereinafter Mirchandani, Beyond Therapy).
214. See Rekha Mirchandani, “Hitting is not Manly”: Domestic Violence Court and the Re-
Imagination of the Patriarchal State, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 781, 798–91 (2006) (describing practices
in a misdemeanor domestic violence court).
215. See Aaron Arnold, The Parent Support Program: A Problem-Solving Court Approach to
Child Support Enforcement, 61 CHILD SUPPORT Q. 25, 25–26 (2009).
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broader cultural change within the group is also a goal.216 These problem-
solving court practices also demonstrate the permeability of legal systems
to ideologies associated with social change movements and shifting thera-
peutic models.
Some theorists take an optimistic view of the porous relationship be-
tween courts and outside ideologies, including those of social movements.
For example, at a colloquium at the Center for Court Innovation, it was
argued that problem-solving courts are democratizing when they “try to
channel the energies of social change into the judicial branch.”217 How-
ever, a review of the racial and gender dynamics of the lower courts shows
little reason for optimism. The absorption of ideology is a mechanism for
identifying or creating targets for state action. Moreover, the legal system is
continuing to treat low-income people who are overwhelming people of
color as pathological and in need of reform, rather than seriously consider-
ing the redistribution of resources or systemic reform of legal institutions.
Indeed, existing legal and social structures are reified through the
very fact that special conduct (such as successful completion of treatment)
is required for individuals in the targeted group to escape the default sys-
tem, and by the fact that the default system continues to apply to others.
At the same time, resources are diverted from efforts to change the default
system or to provide social supports outside of the courts or the state. In
these ways, the status quo—including hierarchies of gender, race, and
class—is maintained for targeted groups. This effect is greatly exacerbated
by the tightening of linkages between, as well as within, state systems.
B. Reduced Fragmentation Between Systems
The procedural dangers posed by problem-solving courts for low-
income litigants are magnified when these systems or their subparts inter-
sect. Yet they often do. And in many cases these intersections, like prob-
lem-solving courts themselves, are forged in the name of addressing the
needs of litigants and their perceived vulnerabilities. Two prime examples
of this problem are integrated domestic violence courts, and child support
enforcement. The tightening of linkages among state entities in these ex-
amples shows how reduced fragmentation between systems can exacerbate
vulnerabilities for litigants.
1. Perceived Vulnerability
As noted in the introduction of this Article, fragmentation in court
systems is typically regarded solely as an access to justice problem. These
concerns have been particularly persuasive when litigants perceived as es-
216. See id. at 26 (describing group parenting classes).
217. Colloquium, supra note 206, at 82; see also Mirchandani, Beyond Therapy, supra note
213, at 877 (arguing that problem-solving courts embody ideals of Habermasian deliberative
democracy).
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pecially vulnerable are involved. For example, arguments for “one stop
shopping” as a way to increase access to justice for domestic violence sur-
vivors have informed the creation of integrated courts combining civil and
criminal jurisdiction over domestic violence cases, while consolidating ser-
vices.218 Because an incident of domestic violence can result in multiple
legal actions, the concern is that having to attend court hearings in differ-
ent locations makes it harder for survivors to obtain legal remedies. An-
other concern is that having more than one judge involved in the case can
lead to conflicting court orders, which may endanger victims and allow
perpetrators to game the system and evade accountability.219 Similar argu-
ments have informed the proliferation of family justice centers for domes-
tic violence and sexual assault survivors, combining specialized law
enforcement and prosecutorial teams with social and legal services in one
location.220
Child support is another area where perceived vulnerabilities fuel
consolidation of civil and criminal processes, diminishing the distinctions
between legal systems. This includes the use of incarceration to enforce
child support orders, through both civil contempt proceedings and crimi-
nal prosecutions brought under felony nonsupport laws.221 As we have
seen, these interventions are driven by concerns for needy children, poten-
tially dependent on the state, and the background trope of deadbeat dads—
images and metaphors that also have been used to justify denying indigent
noncustodial parents counsel as a matter of right in enforcement
proceedings.222
While neither the civil nor criminal system works according to its
ideal for low-income families, bringing them together exacerbates the
problems with each. For example, litigants in family courts already face
increased exposure to the child welfare system, particularly when domestic
218. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 29 (1999).
219. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts and
Court Pluralism, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 103 (2011) [hereinafter MacDowell, When Courts
Collide]; see Epstein, supra note 218, at 23–28; see also Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Ac-
countability in the Child Protection System, 93 KY. L. J. 613, 637 (2004-05) (asserting that “[l]ack
of communication among various systems impedes batterer accountability”).
220. Jane K. Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER, 189 201–05
(2016).
221. See supra Part I.A (describing the origins of the family court system); see also supra Part
I.B (discussing the problem of civil contempt proceedings in child support cases).
222. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Turner v. Rogers case and observing that state interests
are served by blaming child support policy failures on noncustodial parents). See also Ann Cam-
mett, Deadbeat Dads and Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C.J.L. & SOC.
JUST. 233, 237–38 (2014) (detailing how racially laden metaphors, including that of the “dead-
beat dad,” justify legal and social policies that harm low-income families of color).
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violence claims are raised.223 However, there is a heightened risk of being
reported to child protective services when using integrated courts, due to
greater exposure to government workers and other mandated child abuse
reporters.224 As noted previously, this can lead to the survivor being
charged with failure to protect her child, and the child being removed
from the home; awareness of these risks might also discourage survivors
from disclosing information that could help their case, or  from seeking
legal help at all.225 Additionally, survivors using integrated courts are more
likely to be steered to unwanted services or induced to make a criminal
complaint, despite how these steps might impact their safety.226 More gen-
erally, the influence of informalized civil systems on criminal procedures in
integrated courts may further erode due process norms over the long
term.227 The implications of this erosion for domestic violence cases
should be of particular concern, due to the deeply entwined nature of
survivor safety and defendants’ perceptions of procedural justice. The lack
of procedural protections in informalized criminal court settings can lead
defendants to feel they are being victimized by the legal process—percep-
tions that weaken compliance with court orders and endanger survivors.228
Consequently, while integrated courts may further the interests of the
consolidated state in efficiency, they are not well suited to the interests of
the low-income women of color who frequently rely on the courts for
assistance in these cases.
Similarly, child support enforcement procedures may serve state in-
terests better than those of poor families. As noted previously, enforcement
procedures frequently defeat the goal shared by the state, public, and custo-
dial parents of providing support to children—for example, by incarcerat-
ing parents who cannot pay support or causing a working parent to lose
their job.229 However, as also noted, the welfare state has another interest:
minimizing unreimbursed welfare expenses.230 Maintaining the threat of
incarceration as a way to compel support payments thus remains appealing.
Moreover, since incarceration often operates as a funding mechanism for
223. Reports to child welfare agencies may be made by judges or any mandated reporter
with whom the survivor has contact about the abuse. See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, From Victims
to Litigants, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1329, 1324 (2016) [hereinafter MacDowell, Victims to Litigants]
(discussing contact with mandated reporters at courthouse self-help centers).
224. See MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 219, at 117; Epstein, supra note 218,
at 34–35.
225. See MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 219, at 117.
226. Epstein, supra note 218, at 38.
227. MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 219, at 128.
228. Id. at 125–26.
229. See supra Part I.B (analyzing the interests at stake in child support enforcement).
230. Id.
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the state, incarceration serves state fiscal interests in this way as well.231
More generally, maintaining procedures that blame child poverty on dead-
beat dads benefits the state as a collective entity by distracting the public
from structural social problems like declining employment opportunities,
decreasing social mobility for low-wage workers, and inadequate state wel-
fare policies, all of which more directly contribute to child poverty.
For low-income families, these tightening links among civil, admin-
istrative, and criminal legal systems are at the heart of the maintenance of
intersecting systems of poverty and inequality. The role of child support
enforcement in this regard was highlighted by the death of Walter Scott in
2015. Scott, an African-American man, was fatally shot in the back by
police officers who had pulled him over for a broken taillight after he
scuffled with one of them and ran away on foot—possibly because he
feared they were going to send him back to jail for unpaid child sup-
port.232 Although Scott was working at the time of his death, he had
stopped paying support and there was an outstanding warrant for nonpay-
ment that was issued for his arrest. His family believed that warrant was on
his mind when he ran from the police. “Every job [Scott] has had, he has
gotten fired from because he went to jail because he was locked up for
child support,” explained Scott’s brother.233 The culmination of this vi-
cious cycle in Scott’s death by police violence illustrates all too well the
stakes of tightening linkages among civil and criminal arms of the state for
low-income families, and Black families in particular.
2. Privacy and Autonomy
Intersecting civil and criminal court responses also have implications
for autonomy. As a system of private law, the civil system is available to
address the concerns of private individuals and groups who can take legal
action and seek remedies for injuries independent of the state.234 In con-
trast, the criminal system is reserved for government action on behalf of
the public, and is intended to serve public aims.235 Whereas the plaintiff in
a civil action determines when and where to bring an action, and what
remedies to seek (subject of course to applicable legal rules and doctrines),
the prosecution directs a criminal case.236 Accordingly, the distinction be-
tween criminal and civil responses is typically characterized as one of rela-
231. See generally LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CHARGING IN-
MATES PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/blog/Charging_Inmates_Mass_Incarceration.pdf.
232. Frances Robles & Shaila Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y.
TIMES, April 19, 2015, at A1.
233. Id.
234. MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 219, at 115–16.
235. Id. at 102.
236. Id. at 115–16.
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tive autonomy for plaintiffs, with greater autonomy available in civil
forums.237
The autonomyenhancing aspects of civil systems have been viewed as
especially valuable for litigants for whom those conditions are in short sup-
ply. For example, domestic violence survivors, whose privacy and auton-
omy is often restricted as part of the abuse, are thought to benefit from
civil processes because of the relative control they are able to exert over the
process.238 Studies have found that giving survivors a sense of control over
their lives increases their sense of security and well-being, and empowers
them to make additional, positive life changes.239 Additionally, advocates
argue that survivors have superior knowledge about what measures will
ensure their safety. For these reasons, choice is viewed as a valuable com-
modity available to survivors in civil but not criminal courts.
As we have seen, however, this distinction between civil and criminal
legal systems is curtailed in delegalized court settings. The vulnerabilities of
domestic violence survivors are used to justify interventionist policies and
programs such as integrated courts and family justice centers that increase
their exposure to coercive arms of the state.240 Similarly, while a legal
system that promotes privacy and autonomy for low-income people in
exercising family functions would be beneficial, these qualities are in short
supply. Aggressive child support enforcement efforts alienate families and
thwart more cooperative efforts to support children.241 Efforts to collect
child support to reimburse the state for welfare payments also redirects
resources away from the poorest families. For families in which noncus-
todial parents cannot or will not provide support for their children, the
options for custodial parents who are ineligible for cash assistance, or un-
willing to seek it, are limited.242 As in the first family courts at the turn of
237. Id. at 115–18.
238. See, e.g., Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A
Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 95 n.15 (2005) (opining that civil protective
orders may be more effective than criminal protective orders “because the victim, not the gov-
ernment, is the petitioner”).
239. See Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, New Approaches to Poverty Law, Teaching, and Practice:
Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 347
n.25 (1995) (observing that “[s]uccess stories of this kind do not appear in the press because the
absence of violence is not considered a newsworthy event”). See SMITH, supra note 34, at 117
n.155, 121 n.176 (citing studies).
240. See supra Part III.B.1.
241. For example, research shows that African American families in particular often make
informal arrangements that allow for low-income noncustodial fathers to stay involved in their
children’s lives and contribute to their welfare in ways other than through financial support, such
as by providing child care or by providing necessities like diapers or school clothes that custodial
parents cannot afford. See Jennifer M. Threlfall et al., The Parenting Role of African American Fa-
thers in the Context of Urban Poverty, 19 J. CHILD POVERTY 46, 46–47 (2013).
242. In this context, it is important to note the extreme limits on access to welfare benefits
and the social shaming of recipients. See BRYAN STRONG, CHRISTINE DEVAULT & THEODORE
COHEN, THE MARRIAGE AND FAMILY EXPERIENCE: INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS IN A CHANG-
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the twentieth century, these parents can pursue punitive and possibly
counterproductive enforcement measures that may result in incarceration
or do nothing.
The challenges faced by litigants in problem-solving courts demon-
strate how tightening linkages within and between state subsystems simul-
taneously reduces the remedial or supportive aspects of these systems and
lessens the autonomy of low-income families, with serious consequences
for safety and family formation. The effects of tightening also suggest the
positive role that fragmentation can have within the legal system. While
dysfunctional fragmentation creates barriers to access by making remedies
hard to obtain, functional fragmentation—such as separating punitive from
potentially supportive state functions—can protect against the more coer-
cive aspects of the regulatory state. Moreover, the value of functional frag-
mentation suggests that a strong state is not always desirable.
IV. FUNCTIONAL FRAGMENTATION
For vulnerability theorists, the purpose of a strong state is to provide
the necessary social supports for individuals to thrive. However, conven-
tional analyses of vulnerability often justify a more coercive state and ob-
scure the ways in which the lack of adequate social supports contributes to
tightening. For example, we have seen that inadequate economic support
for families by the state as well as concern for child poverty underlies puni-
tive approaches to child support enforcement.243 Similarly, a persistent dis-
regard for the autonomy of domestic violence survivors as well as concerns
about access to justice drives the consolidation of state resources in inte-
grated courts and family violence centers.244
A structural analysis of the problem suggests the value of a prophylac-
tic approach to the operation of state power. Taking into account the pro-
clivity of the state to increase its coercive power through tightening and
the limits of accountability measures such as those provided by attorney
representation to prevent it, we should consider a strategic weakening, or
fracturing of the state. However, reconfiguring the fragmented state to be
more functional for poor people requires guiding principles to identify
functional from dysfunctional fragmentation. This Part describes two
foundational principles for achieving functional fragmentation: fully cen-
tering the experiences of low-income people of color in analyzing system
problems and potential interventions and maintaining partiality to social
justice values and the needs of poor people of color in system design and
implementation.
ING SOCIETY 449 (2008) (discussing low benefit amounts and sharply curtailed time limits for
receiving benefits, and the social stigma associated with receiving welfare).
243. See supra Part I.B (discussing competing interests in child support enforcement).
244. See supra Part III.B (describing how the benefits of coordination are used to justify
consolidating state resources in integrated courts and family violence centers).
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A. Centering the Experiences of Low-Income People of Color
As we have seen, a conventional analysis of the vulnerability (for ex-
ample, one not taking relative privilege and institutionalized power and
inequity into account) is often used to legitimate a more coercive and
hyper-regulatory state. Such analyses tend to ignore the damaging impacts
that converging regulatory systems can have on low-income people absent
effective procedural protections. They also tend to demonstrate the validity
of concerns about using vulnerability as a basis for state action without also
considering possible impacts on the privacy and autonomy of particular
groups. To counter these problems and fully assess the implications of ac-
cess to justice interventions, an intersectional analysis—one that takes into
account the ways in which social positions such as class, gender, and race
interact to produce unique outcomes—is necessary.
Informed by intersectionality, consideration of proposed interven-
tions should include a particularized analysis of the following: What are
the likely consequences of the proposed intervention on low-income peo-
ple of color, given the enduring nature of structural inequality and predict-
able impacts on the most subordinated community members? Is the risk to
privacy, autonomy, and empowerment more than the benefit for those
vulnerable to the coercive state? Are there alternative ways to achieve the
desired end that present less risk? With the goal of creating a bulwark
against the state in the context of problem-solving courts, and the benefits
of an intersectional analysis, several priorities for a more functional frag-
mentation can be identified.
An obvious first step is untangling the aspects of the state that are
primarily faultfinding and punitive from those intended to be primarily
supportive or voluntary. In a prior article, I referred to the value of this
type of fragmentation between civil and criminal courts as “court plural-
ity.”245 Given the multiplicity of systems involved, however (including pu-
nitive civil family law systems such as child welfare), system plurality would
be a better term. Using the proposed framework to review interventions
that implicate system plurality may reveal that the value of consolidating
systems to address dysfunctional fragmentation is overstated.
For example, as noted above, integrated courts proliferate due to the
purported advantages of one stop shopping for low-income survivors, de-
spite the harms posed by combining civil and criminal jurisdiction, espe-
cially for women of color. However, the assumptions behind integrated
domestic violence courts do not hold up to scrutiny. Concerns about con-
flicting orders arising when related domestic violence cases are heard in
separate civil and criminal courts can easily be resolved in other ways, such
as by improving case management systems and by establishing rules that
245. See MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 219, at 127.
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prioritize criminal over civil orders.246 Hearing civil and criminal cases
before the same judicial officer offers no strategic advantage to survivors in
most cases, and may in fact present serious disadvantages.247 At the same
time, problems with overly fragmented civil jurisdiction over related family
law matters such as paternity, support, or child custody can be resolved
through reforms to civil courts alone.248 Given the availability of these
alternatives and in light of the potential harms to survivors (such as expo-
sure to unwanted criminal and child welfare interventions), an intersec-
tional analysis should result in a different outcome that retains the
protective value of system plurality.
Additional steps would also be necessary to untangle system func-
tions, some of which will require substantial legal reforms. For example,
child welfare reporting laws create exposure for domestic violence victims
in traditional as well as integrated courts. Thus, reporting guidelines and
protocols need to be revised in order to fully address the problem. Addi-
tionally, parents will remain vulnerable to unwanted interventions in pro
se courts with little accountability and vast discretion. For these reasons,
family law scholars have called for changes in child custody laws that
would both narrow the discretion of family court judges and make child
custody decisions more amenable to the traditional judicial fact-finding
role.249 Protecting litigants on the margins also involves creating rights, and
removing barriers for the exercise of rights, such as removing sex/gender
and immigration status as tools that can be used to enforce biases in family
courts. Litigants also require the resources to enforce rights in recalcitrant
systems. As discussed above, lawyers play an important role in maintaining
functional fragmentation within problem-solving courts by enforcing due
process norms. Thus, the strategic deployment of lawyers within the sys-
tem is also needed as part of a concerted, multi-pronged effort at court
reform.
More generally, reformers should work to limit the power of judges
to extend beyond their role as arbiters of rights and resist the inclination to
use the coercive power of courts where other modes of intervention are
possible. As law professor Jane Spinak argues, “if the state is going to inter-
vene in families’ lives via judicial proceedings, the court must add value to
246. Id. at 111–12 (explaining why consolidated civil and criminal actions do not result in
advantages of strategy or efficiency).
247. Id. at 112–13 (describing problems that can result from having one judge hear a re-
lated criminal and custody case).
248. Id. Notably, problems stemming from having multiple courts handling related civil
family matters is an issue in a relatively small and decreasing number of states. As of 2006, only
thirteen states did not have a specialized or separate system for family law matters. Barbara A.
Babb, Where We Stand: An Analysis of America’s Family Law Adjudicatory Systems and the Mandate
to Establish Unified Family Courts, 46 FAM. L.Q. 230, 231 (2008).
249. See, e.g., Fineman, Dominant Discourse, supra note 195, at 770–74 (proposing the “pri-
mary caretaker test” to replace the best interest of the child standard in custody cases).
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the intervention beyond what a social service, child welfare, or probation
agency can provide. That value or purpose is protection of the family’s
substantive due process right of family integrity.”250 In particular, reform-
ers should work to identify when and where social problems are being
handled by courts that should be relocated to institutions that are better
suited to address them. Indeed, a core counter-hegemonic strategy for re-
form involves recharacterizing as matters of social policy those issues that
the state seeks to regulate through individualized court interventions. For
example, problems related to child support enforcement involve child pov-
erty for which the state fails to adequately provide; domestic violence im-
plicates a lack of intersectional equality and economic justice. To the
extent that a legal controversy exists that requires court action, it should be
adjudicated according to due process norms.
The question of what is a legal issue requiring adjudication is obvi-
ously complex, however. Controversies are legal because they are defined
as legal, and treated as legal problems. Moreover, poor people may insist on
the legal nature of their claims in the face of state opposition—which is
one crux of the problem in family courts, where the legal nature of dis-
putes is downplayed but the coercive power of the court is maintained.251
Families also need meaningful alternatives to adversarial litigation of dis-
putes, however defined. This brings us to a second principle of functional
fragmentation: the consideration of partiality and impartiality—or, as I ad-
vocate for below, reconsideration of these concepts.
B. (Re)considering Partiality and Impartiality
Disrupting the characteristics of problem-solving courts that are
problematic for poor people requires attention to partiality and impartial-
ity. As observed by Ben Ishai, the operation of partiality (such as among
advocates) and impartiality (such as among finders of fact/adjudicators) is a
defining feature of state fragmentation, and can be used to protect the in-
terests of otherwise marginalized groups within the state.252 As this sug-
gests, the appropriate level of partiality or impartiality depends in part on
where a given actor is located in the system, their function, and the values
associated with that function.
Consider social workers and other non-legal professionals in family
courts, for example. This Article has critiqued the negative role that these
professionals play in family courts.253 Yet, non-lawyers are also potentially
250. Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right Between Rhetoric and Reality,
31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 17–18 (2009).
251. For an in-depth exploration of lower-income people’s struggle to establish the legal
nature of their claims in the face of resistance from court personnel, see generally SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-
CLASS AMERICANS (1990).
252. See discussion Part II.A, supra.
253. See, e.g., Part I.A. (describing family court delegalization).
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of great value in legal aid programs that aim to provide more holistic repre-
sentation, where their different expertise can complement that of tradi-
tionally trained lawyers.254 How is this not a contradiction? The answer
lies in how the non-legal professional is positioned in relation to the court
and to litigants: is the professional functionally a part of the court’s coer-
cive power? Do they supplant rather than augment legal perspectives? Or
are they working in support of a social justice informed, advocacy-based
response? Only the former is associated with the hyper-regulatory nature
of problem-solving courts.
As I have described elsewhere:
Social work advocacy is informed by values that are similar in
many respects to those at the core of social justice lawyering.
These values include respecting the dignity and rights of indi-
viduals (e.g., every human being is unique and deserving); ad-
dressing imbalances of power and injustice (e.g., by giving voice
to marginalized groups and individuals); facilitating self-deter-
mination (e.g., by helping clients to identify their own needs
and actions they will take to fulfill them); compassion and the
desire to relieve suffering; empowering through action-ori-
ented advocacy (e.g., to help clients take action to solve
problems); and honoring social justice.255
However, like lawyers, social workers often work within the same institu-
tional structures that harm their clients, which can lead to an erosion of
social justice commitments and values.256 Thus, the issue is how to create
the conditions that allow these professionals to operate in ways that are
beneficial to poor people. Taking the fragmented state into account allows
us to see some possibilities.
254. See MacDowell, Reimagining, supra note 8, at 521–24 (comparing and contrasting the
expertise of lawyers and social workers and other lay advocates); id. at 536–38 (advocating for
legal service models that combine the expertise of social workers and lawyers).
255. Id. at 516 (citing ROBERT L. SCHNEIDER & LORI LESTER, SOCIAL WORK ADVO-
CACY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 78–79 (2001)). See also NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC.
WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS, Preamble 1 (2017) [hereinafter NASW CODE OF ETHICS],
https://www.socialworkers.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ms_ArtLqzeI%3d&portalid=0 (iden-
tifying the core values of social work as service, social justice, dignity and worth of the person,
importance of human relationships, integrity, and competence). The CODE further states, “So-
cial workers promote social justice and social change with and on behalf of clients . . . Social
workers are sensitive to cultural and ethnic diversity and strive to end discrimination, oppression,
poverty, and other forms of social injustice.” Id.
256. See Stephen M. Rose, Advocacy/Empowerment: An Approach to Clinical Practice for Social
Work, 17 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 41, 41 (1990); see also Anne Marie McLaughlin, Clinical
Social Workers: Advocates for Social Justice, 10 ADVANCES SOC. WORK 51, 51 (2009) (noting criti-
ques of social workers for a lack of attention to social justice issues).
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1. Revisiting Mediation
Attention to structure allows us to reimagine the relationships within
problem-solving courts, such as between family court mediators and
judges—relationships currently characterized by ideological uniformity.
Possibilities for more functional fragmentation include targeting the educa-
tion, recruitment, and training of family court services staff members to
shift their ideological commitments and practices in directions more al-
igned with the interests of low-income litigants as a class. One way to do
so in the dispute resolution context is by promoting the use of social justice
mediation.
Although the dominant approach to mediation is that of neutral me-
diator, social justice mediation teaches mediators how to address structural
inequalities such as gender, race, and sexuality and how they shape the
conflict.257 Much has been written on the process dangers of mediation for
the more vulnerable party in relationships characterized by abuse and other
power imbalances.258 Moreover, there is probably no reliable way to screen
cases involving abuse from mediation, even if such screening were desira-
ble.259 Thus, it is important in any mediation program to ensure that
mediators can help balance inequalities of power. These concerns are even
more acute in the largely pro se setting of family courts where litigants lack
legal counsel and are subject to multiple forms of structural inequality.
Social justice approaches also encourage the mediator to locate the rele-
vance of their own social position within the mediation.260 Given the like-
lihood that many mediators and other legal and court services staff
members are more privileged than the people they serve, and the predom-
inance of negative stereotypes about low-income people and minorities, it
is important to make consideration of such differences explicit.
Additionally, other mediation styles could be integrated into a social
justice mediation approach to make alternative dispute resolution more
useful for parties who do not have access to lawyers. These include media-
tion styles in which the mediator takes a more educative role with the
257. Leah Wing, Whither Neutrality, in RE-CENTERING: CULTURE AND KNOWLEDGE IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTICE 93, 107 (Mary Trujillo et al. eds., 2008); LEAH WING, SO-
CIAL JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 18 (2002). See also Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger,
Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 18–22 (2012)
(describing models for social justice mediation).
258. Chief among these works is law professor Trina Grillo’s seminal article, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L. J. 1545 (1991).
259. MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 219, at 114 (reporting empirical evidence
that courts often fail to identify cases involving domestic violence and that “intake processes
established specifically to identify the existence of domestic violence have been unsuccessful”).
260. Elli Nagai-Rothe, Challenging Neutrality, Examining Privilege and Encouraging Practitioner
Self-Reflexivity: A Social Justice Approach to ADR, MEDIATE.COM (July 2010), http://www.medi-
ate.com/articles/NagaiRotheE1.cfm.
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parties in terms of explaining legal options.261 Law professors Jane Murphy
and Jana Singer also recommend expanding the availability of frameworks
that operate outside of the two-party dyad, such as family conferencing,
which might benefit families with extended and alternative family
forms.262
Another possibility is moving family services such as alternative dis-
pute resolution out of courts altogether. Murphy and Singer attribute sev-
eral advantages to locating family dispute resolution services in
communities rather than courts. They argue that it may help normalize
divorce and parental separation as “not primarily legal events, but rather
ongoing processes of family reorganization.”263 While this is precisely the
view that subjects families to ongoing state interventions in family courts,
Murphy and Singer hope that shifting the resolution of such issues to the
community may encourage parents to take responsibility for the resolution
of their current or future disputes rather than relying on third-party adju-
dication.264 They believe that community-based services may also be more
accessible to low-income families wary of state bureaucracies such as
courts, allow for better coordination with other community resources and
programs, and act as a mechanism to coordinate families with multiple
legal actions.265 Additionally, a community-based approach may be more
responsive to cultural diversity than is typical of legal institutions while
freeing up courts to focus on establishing legal norms and resolving issues
in the most adversarial cases.266
While the case for community-based services is promising, consider-
ation of partiality and impartiality within an intersectional analysis suggests
that more steps are necessary to protect or advance the interests of low-
income litigants. Community-based does not necessarily mean commu-
nity-centered, and the hegemonic power of family courts can easily be
extended to other sites. My research on self-help services programs run as
partnerships between NGOs and courts, for example, shows how staff
members sometimes discourage individuals from accessing legal remedies
and often interact with litigants in ways that reinforce race and gender-
based stereotypes.267 These problems arise when programs lack the re-
sources and/or commitment to address systemic problems, including struc-
tural inequalities within family courts, and lack sufficient accountability
261. See MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 52, at 137 (discussing alternative models of
mediation).
262. See id.
263. Id. at 130.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 130–31.
266. Id.
267. See MacDowell, Politics of Self-Help, supra note 117, at 246–51.
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measures.268 These programs can also drain resources from partnering ad-
vocacy groups while failing to advance their missions.269 Thus, it will be
important to find ways to support and protect the partiality of family ser-
vices programs for the communities being served wherever they are lo-
cated and whether they are run by the state, NGOs, or partnerships
between the two.270 Studies of existing community-based family services
programs in the United States and England also indicate a need to increase
public interest or buy-in.271
Murphy and Singer recommend strengthening programs and partici-
pation through improved research, pilot programs, and incentives for using
community-based services.272 However, the reality is that community-
centered goals and objectives may be difficult to establish or sustain within
agency-based models of service delivery. Such models tend to be centered
on agency priorities rather than those of the community, and to encourage
dependency on the agency rather than engendering community resource-
fulness and independence.273 Moreover, research and experience suggest
that social justice commitments are incompatible with hierarchical and bu-
reaucratic organizational forms often associated with agency models.274
Reformers must therefore work diligently to make sure that services help
build capacity and maintain accountability within the communities they
serve. While a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, one way to strengthen program research and development is to involve
268. See MacDowell, Victims to Litigants, supra note 223, at 1318–24 (analyzing how the
conditions and structure of self-help services impact staff members’ demeanor toward survivors).
269. See id. at 1326–27.
270. I will address the complexities of fragmentation as it relates to relationships between
the state and civil society in greater detail in a future article.
271. See MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 56, at 132 (discussing existing programs and ob-
serving that low participation rates might stem from a lack of knowledge or understanding about
community-based alternatives). Community-based mediation is also available through legal aid in
some areas. See, e.g., LEGAL AID ONTARIO, http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/about/fact_family
mediationandILA.asp (last visited May 14, 2018) (Ontario, Canada); NATIONAL FAMILY MEDIA-
TION, http://www.nfm.org.uk/index.php/family-mediation/legal-aid (last visited May 14,
2018) (Great Britain), and LEGAL AID NEW SOUTH WALES, http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/
what-we-do/family-law/family-dispute-resolution (last visited May 14, 2018) (New South
Wales, Australia).
272. MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 52, at 132.
273. See Paul Wahrhaftig, An Overview of Community-Oriented Citizen Dispute Resolution
Programs in the United States, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 75, 83 (1985). See also id. at
95 (finding that most citizen dispute resolution programs follow an “agency model”). Wahrhaftig
concludes that, “although [agency models] are more informal and humanistic, they preserve the
existing relationship between the communities served and the justice system.” Id.
274. See, e.g., MacDowell, Reimagining, supra note 8, at 524-25, 538–39 (summarizing re-
search showing how organizational form impacts advocates’ ability to analyze and understand the
relationship between individuals and social structures in the context of advocacy for domestic
violence survivors).
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communities meaningfully in these efforts.275 Accountability measures are
another cornerstone of court reform and the development of community-
based alternatives.
2. Fragmentation and Accountability
Vulnerability theorists advocate for rigorous monitoring and evalua-
tion of institutional programs and policies to make sure they serve human
needs. Within the fragmented state, accountability also derives from the
“immanent self-critique” that opposing perspectives and roles bring to
bear on a problem.276 One source of this form of accountability in the
adversarial legal system is lawyers, who help enforce due process protec-
tions and maintain accountability of the state.277 However, as we have
seen, both lawyers and due process are in short supply in problem-solving
courts. Thus, strategic deployment of lawyers in problem-solving courts is
essential. This includes securing their presence in cases where lawyers can
most make a difference for structural reform.
As noted previously, there are limits on the availability of lawyers due
to the underfunding of federal legal aid, and the doctrinal interpretations
that limit the constitutional right to an attorney.278 There are also restric-
tions on legal aid practice imposed by federal law for those organizations
receiving funding from the Legal Services Corporation, including restric-
tions that impact structural reform efforts such as lobbying.279 Also prob-
lematic, however, is the seeming lack of will to seek substantive legal
change on the part of some legal aid organizations.
Most federally funded public interest law offices focus on individual
services rather than social change.280 Moreover, federal funding restrictions
alone cannot explain the abdication of structural reform work by many
legal aid providers. Many legal aid programs abandoned structural reform
efforts before federal restrictions; conversely, some manage to continue so-
cial justice-oriented work in full compliance with federal restrictions.281 In
275. One way to do this is by utilizing participatory action research methods. For an over-
view of action research, see Bruce L. Berg, Action Research, in QUALITATIVE METHODS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 195–208 (2004). As explained by Berg, this method “is intended to uncover
or produce information and knowledge that will be directly useful to a group of people (through
research, education, and sociopolitical action) . . . [and to] enlighten and empower the average
person in the group, motivating each one to take up and use the information gathered in the
research.” Id. at 197 (citations and emphasis omitted).
276. See supra Part II.A.
277. See supra Part I.B.
278. See supra Part I.A and B.
279. See DILLER & SAVNER, supra note 74, at 688–89 (detailing restrictions on practice of
law by legal aid offices receiving federal funding).
280. Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest Prac-
tice: 1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1618 (2006).
281. Gary F. Smith, Poverty Warriors: A Historical Perspective on the Mission of Legal Services,
45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 34, 39 (2011). See also Richard L. Abel, Law
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addition, non-federally funded programs have also moved away from pov-
erty elimination work.282 A modest intervention aimed at improving legal
aid services is to incentivize structural reform goals by tying the existence
of a plan for strategic structural reform and related accountability measures
to funding opportunities. Additionally, planned partnerships between legal
aid and state entities such as courts should explain how the nongovern-
mental partner will maintain independence from the state, and demon-
strate its capacity to do so.283
Accountability for courts could also be encouraged through the use
of ombudsman programs. Current processes for resolving complaints about
judicial officers and other court personnel are inadequate. Pro se litigants
face numerous barriers in bringing such complaints.284 Moreover, even if
the litigant has representation, attorneys have disincentives for lodging
complaints against judges.285 Furthermore, of the complaints about judicial
conduct that are filed, almost all are dismissed without any action being
taken.286 As observed by legal scholar Jane Stoever, “current processes tend
to value judicial independence at the expense of judicial
accountability.”287
In response, some courts in the United States have adopted
ombudsman offices to investigate and resolve complaints.288 In England
and Wales, the government went a step further by creating a Judicial Ap-
pointments Ombudsman to oversee the work done by the Office for Judi-
cial Complaints (OJC).289 The Ombudsman constitutes another layer of
oversight with a dual purpose: reviewing complaints about the OJC’s han-
Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 576–77 (1985)
(reporting that legal aid lawyers performed relatively little legal reform work in the 1980s, before
the current federal restrictions).
282. Smith, supra note 281, at 39. However, they are more likely to do such work than
their federally-funded counterparts. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 280, at 1620.
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for systemic reform that benefits vulnerable litigants”).
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285. Id. at 368.
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visited May 14, 2018).
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dling of complaints (thereby increasing public confidence in the courts),
and helping to ensure a robust judicial appointments process.290
From the standpoint of functional fragmentation, the British model is
superior in that the ombudsman has greater independence from the courts.
However, in the American federal system, there are obviously challenges in
encouraging states to create new government entities, especially during
fiscally limited times. Still, this is an area where the federal government
could take the lead through rule of law programs, providing funding and
guidance on best practices to support the research and development of
ombudsman programs at the state level to increase judicial accountability.
CONCLUSION: BUILDING JUSTICE SPACE
This Article has advocated for a new view of fragmentation—one
where state fragmentation can have a positive function for poor and low-
income people. The notion of state fragmentation recognizes that the state
is not monolithic. It also suggests that there are spaces where the state is
not omnipresent, at least conceptually. I propose that this includes justice
space. Justice space can be envisioned within the nooks and crannies of a
fragmented state, and in spaces not fully occupied by the state, such as
within civil society. These spaces afford opportunities for individuals to
challenge state practices and maneuver strategically among state entities.
Justice space can also be a place to foster the conditions and capacities
necessary for resistance to subordination. This view of fragmentation both
challenges and expands on prior theories of vulnerability and the state, and
shows the need for new access to justice practices.
Vulnerability theorists want a strong and supportive state, capable of
fostering resilience to vulnerability. Thus, their view might be that we
should focus on the ability of the state to provide justice within the legal
system. However, while one goal of functional fragmentation is a more just
legal system, a second is to create the capacity for more justice. The latter
includes the expansion of justice-oriented dispute resolution methods, in-
cluding in civil society. It also includes developing the assets needed to
engage in the pursuit of justice, which may be created in and outside of
state institutions, or in resistance to them. Creating new spaces for justice
work and for developing the assets needed for that work does not relieve
the state of its responsibility to provide justice. Rather, it recognizes the
need for spaces, including those located outside the state, from which indi-
viduals and communities pursue justice. These insights can inform further
analysis by vulnerability theorists of the relationship between civil society,
resilience, and state accountability as pertains to access to justice.
In turn, the insights of the revised vulnerability theory proposed here
need to be incorporated more widely into conceptions of access to justice
and the provision of legal services. Vulnerability theorists acknowledge that
290. Id.
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concrete institutional structures shape social power relationships; therefore,
they demand that institutions are structured to better serve human needs.
Utilizing these insights, and taking relative privilege, privacy, and auton-
omy into account, interventions into poor people’s courts should seek not
merely to provide access to existing legal systems, but also to mitigate the
harm caused to low-income people using those systems, foster accounta-
bility, and develop meaningful alternatives. This requires a broad approach
to providing access, including the provision of opportunities for people to
develop the assets necessary for social, legal, and political resilience and
change. Attention to functional as well as problematic fragmentations in
the state is one way to engage this project and create space for justice as
well as access.
Ultimately, building justice space requires fostering equality and au-
tonomy—not in the narrow or superficial sense of liberalism, but in the
substantive, wide-ranging, yet attentive to particularities sense of an anti-
subordination agenda. In the final analysis, as we develop new approaches
to achieving these goals, the question will be: has justice space been in-
creased or decreased through this intervention, and how? This in turn will
involve deciding, within particular contexts, what human resilience within
justice looks like.
